

PRESS COMMENT

162-72

18 October 1972

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COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

JAPAN TIMES
12 October 1972

China's Nuclear Policy

China's scornful abuse of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms agreement and general efforts to block international disarmament efforts in the United Nations can only be interpreted as an attempt to justify its own development of nuclear weapons. Peking's policy certainly contributes nothing to world peace.

Almost immediately after ceremonies were held last week in the White House—attended by President Richard Nixon and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko—to mark the signing of the agreement, China sounded off in the U.N. China opposed the general view that the agreement, although limited in scope, was a significant step toward disarmament and toward averting a nuclear war. Under the pact, the U.S. and the Soviet Union will limit the number of defensive missiles and freeze the number of offensive missiles at their present levels for five years.

Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, in his nation's first policy speech to the General Assembly, stated that the U.S.-Soviet agreement "can by no means be regarded as a step toward nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, this marks the beginning of a new stage in the Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms race."

He condemned the agreement for not accomplishing the ultimate goal—total disarmament—in one step, rather than accept the fact that such an aim can only be accomplished gradually.

But nothing pleases Peking. Mr. Chiao was equally scathing in his attack against a Soviet proposal—supported by U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim—to start preparations for a world disarmament conference. The Chinese official said that a world disarmament conference would become only an "Empty-Talk Club which would indulge in far-ranging rambling discourse without solving any practical problems."

Unfortunately, the United States also rejected the proposal because such a conference would not be helpful "to the real task of developing the techniques and mutual confidence involved in limiting and reducing armaments." It is our opinion that any effort, even with only a remote chance of success, is worth making because the horror of nuclear warfare remains a constant threat.

Mr. Chiao restated his nation's hard-line nuclear policy which

in essence excludes any cooperation internationally to reduce this danger. "China is making nuclear tests under compulsion," Mr. Chiao said. And he added that "China is ready at any time to stop all her nuclear tests, but only on the day the nuclear weapons of the nuclear superpowers are completely prohibited and thoroughly destroyed and not before."

It is very apparent that China intends to stay outside of any world movement working toward nuclear disarmament for some time to come. And its reasons are obvious if questionable.

It is forecast that China may require decades to catch up with the Soviet Union and the United States in nuclear armaments and that it will not be interested in talking disarmament until it reaches parity.

At this moment, its nuclear armaments, although deadly, are meager in comparison. Military analysts believe China has two dozen medium-range ballistic missiles aimed toward Soviet forces along its border, and the capability to deliver nuclear bombs by aircraft. Also, it is felt that China almost certainly has a small number of nuclear intermediate-range missiles that could reach as far as Moscow.

It is known that China is working on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which when completed could bring all of Asia and the United States into range. Once the first Chinese ICBM splashes down in the ocean, China will be able to engage in "big power" nuclear diplomacy with as yet unknown consequences for Asia and the world.

Certainly, this is one of its main aims in building a nuclear arsenal along with the aim of countering the Soviet threat along its borders. It has not given up its dream of world domination. It wants a nuclear punch to promote this objective. At the same time, China—now extremely active in the world again—sees the need to match as much as possible the nuclear power of the U.S. and the Soviet Union and to balance its military strength against Japan's economic supremacy.

It would be unrealistic to hope that at this time China would agree to any formula to restrain its development of nuclear weapons. But other nations are beginning to become aware of their awesome responsibilities and the need to take the first steps toward disarmament. China may some day also accept this necessity. We hope it will be soon.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 October 1972

Soviet Aide in Border Talks And Envoy Return to China


PEKING, Oct. 17 (France-Press) — The chief Soviet delegate to the Chinese Soviet frontier talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid I. Ilyichev, and the Soviet Ambassador, Vasily S. Tolstikov, returned here today by special plane after a three-month absence.

They were greeted at the airport by Deputy Foreign Minister Yu Chan, the chief Chinese negotiator, and the heads of Eastern European diplomatic missions.

Unlike previous years, Mr. Ilyichev and Mr. Tolstikov did not attend the National Day celebration here on Oct. 1. They left during the second week of July, and indications are that the frontier negotiations have marked time since then.

GENERAL

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 October 1972



Censor button on world TV?

By Charlotte Saikowski

Washington

One day Americans will flick on their television sets and view the progress of harvesting in Soviet Kazakhstan. Across the ocean Britons will sit in their living rooms to see a sumo wrestling match in Tokyo while Russians rush home from work to watch "The Dick Cavett Show."

A fanciful idea?

Not when television broadcasting by space satellite directly into home receivers becomes a reality, and that is expected to be in little more than a decade.

As the age of such satellite TV communication approaches, however, a storm of controversy is gathering around the issue of censorship. In essence, the Communist countries and many developing nations want the right to stop programs at their origin. The United States, believing that there has to be a free marketplace of ideas in the world, staunchly advocates an unfettered flow of information across national boundaries.

The first serious confrontation over the issue will take place at a UNESCO conference this week.

There can be two kinds of television broadcasting from outer space. One is from a satellite to a community TV receiver. The technology for that already exists. This does not raise national hackles, however, because a community receiver is controlled by the state, and the state must release any program beamed from abroad.

Broadcasts also can be transmitted directly into augmented receivers in the home. It is prohibitively expensive to have such receivers now, but by 1985 technology is expected to be advanced to a point where signals can bypass the ground transmitters and be sent directly into ordinary sets.

That is where the problem arises.

Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union, which manipulates its news media for political ends and fears the penetration of Western ideas, seeks maximum control over satellite broadcasting into homes. It now has before the United Nations a draft international convention governing such broadcasts.

The proposal makes transmission of commercials possible only by mutual agreement and excludes any material which propagandizes ideas of war, racial hatred, or immorality, or is aimed at interference in another nation's domestic affairs or foreign policy. It also establishes the tenet of prior consent — a state could broadcast only with the agreement of the receiving state — and gives a country the right to destroy a satellite

anywhere in outer space to stop illegal television broadcasts of which it is the object.

These, of course, are sweeping principles that would enable Moscow to interdict virtually anything it wished.

Not only the Marxist Russians are aroused over the issue, however. Third-world countries are also concerned.

Many of them view a "free flow of information" as only one way, and they fear cultural and political domination by the U.S., other Western countries, or even the Soviet Union, which at present have the technology to send, while the developing nations can only receive.

It can be assumed, for instance, that Hindu Indians would not want to watch a Spanish bullfight and that Italians or Peruvians would resent programs advocating birth control.

Hence the developing nations say there must be provisions regarding their cultural integrity and political independence.

At this juncture there is no early prospect that the far-reaching Soviet draft in the UN will be adopted. It has been referred to a working group and will not come up for consideration in the Outer Space Committee and the General Assembly until 1974, so the U.S. has more than a year's breathing space to work out alternative proposals.

UNESCO, meanwhile, also has a draft declaration which, although it is more moderate than Moscow's proposed convention, nonetheless is unacceptable to the U.S. Sponsored by the third-world countries, it, too, establishes degrees of prior consent for satellite broadcasting into homes.

The U.S. would like to persuade UNESCO to postpone consideration of its declaration until it can be studied by the UN Outer Space Committee. It argues that satellite technology has not yet been fully developed and that the relevant issues have been discussed only by private experts in UNESCO, whereas governments should have an opportunity to study them.

This strategy aimed at postponement has sparked a sharp broadside from Dr. Frank Stanton of the Columbia Broadcasting System, who wants the U.S. to take a firm stand against the UNESCO declaration. He regards the document as a direct challenge to freedom of speech and communication and feels the State Department is temporizing on the issue.

Washington replies that it will vote against the UNESCO proposal, which is likely to be overwhelmingly adopted. But it prefers a deferment of the issue because a vote at this time would accord the declaration a status it does not now enjoy as governments rushed to get on the bandwagon of support for it.

For the Americans, the legal and other problems involved are extremely complex. The First Amendment, for one, prohibits a restraint on private broadcasts, and no treaty could supersede this amendment.

Other questions also arise: What could the U.S. accept on the broadcasting of political propaganda? On the cultural or religious content of programs that might be offensive to another country? On commercial advertising? Can a criterion of news accuracy be enforced?

The U.S. intends to take a hard look at these and other complexities of satellite broadcasting in time for a meeting of the UN working group in June, 1973. By then other governments, too, may have a clearer idea.

Meanwhile, the Dick Cavetts and Walter Cronkites can be mulling over how to amuse or inform or educate what will soon be a planetary audience.

SPECIAL, Brussels
20 September 1972

SECRETS OF THE BLACK SEPTEMBER GROUP

The bloody tragedy of September in Munich should not have come as a surprise. Several Western embassies and a lot of top men in corporations, banks, and business groups were reading as early as October 1970, in a confidential newsletter published in Belgium, about the establishment within certain Palestinian organizations of a "Clandestine Central Committee for the Liberation of Palestine," otherwise known as the CCCLP, which was "determined to rely on both Peking and Moscow, but not to depend on either," and ready to fight on an international level.

This newsletter, called "La Lettre de Bruxelles," raised a few skeptical eyebrows in December 1971 and in January, March, and May 1972, when it announced, after the murder in Cairo of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tall, that the CCCLP had a handful of commandos backed by a vast network of support for its organization of killers right here in our countries. At the time, the newsletter announced that the CCCLP would strike again whenever it looked as if there might be a return to peace in the Middle East. The same newsletter announced that pipelines would be sabotaged -- although of course it did not mention just where -- like those last August in Trieste, as well as possible sabotage of vessels trading with Israel, whether they sailed from close or distant ports.

And so Munich might have been expected, just as, at the time, the bloody incidents that marred the Olympic Games in Mexico might have been predicted. That time it was the South American "brothers" of the Palestinian terrorists who chose the same bloody device to attract international attention.

We have conducted this inquiry and gathered all our data, but we have refrained from making judgments on the merits. We would simply point out that Israel has the right to demand guarantees for its security like any other state in the world, and that the Palestinian people have a right to justice, though they would perhaps already have got it were it not for the way the suffering of others is used and abused by certain "instigators" and "support systems" which see in other people's disappointments and disgust only a means of sowing bloodshed and disorder.

Birth of Black September

The tag "CCCLP" is not a formal one. Those who founded this secret committee 2 years ago simply came out of almost all the organizations then operating inside or outside Palestine: a dozen or so men of action, all of them under 35, all of them fed up with theoretical squabbles, all of them disillusioned with Marxism or with the extreme right, all of them adamant in their rejection of the compromises that would be dictated by any East-West entente in a kind of mini-Yalta on the Israeli-Arab level. It was agreed that each of them would remain a cadre or member in his original organization, and that each man's membership in the Committee would remain a secret, with his life as the guarantee.

One of the founders of the committee that gave birth to Black September the following year early in the fall of 1971,

was Salah Khalaf, under his nom de guerre, Abou Ali Yyad. Until then, this one-eyed giant had commanded the OLP [Organisation pour la Liberation du Palestine; Palestine Liberation Organization] shock-troops. He died in July 1971, in the Jerash caves under fire from Jordanian army troops. His sister, a kind of Passiona-ria devoted to the cause, immediately determined to avenge him, and made contact with several of the secret committee's founders. Out of their meetings came the "Black September Hand," which a few weeks later signed the death-warrant for Wasfi Tall. It was called the "Hand" because it followed the rules of all proper secret organizations: no cell had more than five members, and only one of those members had contact with one neighboring cadre.

As early as 1971, this action group had a sizeable international network. For a year the leaders of the secret committee had taken advantage of their official functions within the old-line Palestinian organizations, which included missions to the several Arab countries as well as to Europe, to recruit on three levels: among Palestinians to build up chains of cells among the students, emigrés, workers, etc., among the "Committees to Support Palestine," and among the Arab embassies, in the Arab League offices all over the world, and also in the embassies and bureaux of of the Maghreb countries.

This explains how Black September has been able to strike in London, Milan, Trieste, Hamburg, Cologne, Rotterdam, and in half a dozen other places over the past 10 months, pulling fifteen or so assassinations, sabotage jobs, and kidnappings which, quite apart from the Munich affair, had already caused some 30 deaths abroad and injured almost as many.

Most of the leaders of Black September's 50 or 60 five-man commando groups were trained in Peking, Moscow, Algeria, East Germany, or North Korea over the past 5 to 6 years. They make up a kind of freemasonry which has no fixed center for a general staff, which in part explains why the organization is so particularly hard to get at. Its only permanent body is a coordinating committee, which apparently has as its top man one Ahmed Djebril, a one-time officer in the Syrian army and longtime chief of the FLP [Front pour la Liberation de la Palestine; Palestine Liberation Front] general staff; he often uses the name Abou Jihad.

For 24 months the Black September Hand has exploited all the wrangling and dissidence that have shaken the Palestinian organizations, which as of today have been reduced to only four official movements. Recruiting was unquestionably helped by the following tie-ins:

with Naief Hawatmeh's FPDLP [Front Populaire Democratique pour la Liberation de la Palestine; People's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine], Black September says it is for "a class approach" to Arab-Israeli and international problems;

with Georges Habbache's FPLP [Front Populaire pour la Liberation de la Palestine; People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine], it advocates direct action: plane highjacking, "selective" terrorism, etc. But Habbache, who has long been tied to Moscow, where he has been since 29 August, not since 5 September as reported elsewhere, last month came out in support of the principle of "reconversion" of the Palestinian groups into a political "united front," temporarily abandoning direct action. This led to a split of the FPLP, with Waddi Haddad, its chief of foreign operations, leaning toward Black September, and Ghassan Kanafani and Abou Chebab siding with Habbache and openly denouncing direct action. Last July, Kanafani was hit by a mysterious

attacker, variously reported to be in the pay of Israel or Jordan. But the truth was that Black September was issuing a cheap warning to somebody who might betray what he knew of the secret committee's plans, particularly since his wife is Danish and, according to Black September, still clings to her Western principles.

All those booby-trapped packages sent to Israel's embassies and missions, or into Israel itself between November 1971 and February 1972 came from Black September, although it signs only the actions it considers important.

Yasser Arafat, the boss of the official Palestinian organizations, knows enough about the strength the secret committee has built up to take a prudent attitude toward it. This is why he did not denounce the Munich murders. Naief Hawatmeh had done so in February 1972, when he criticized Black September for "spontaneism." He has shut up since, knowing full well what fate would befall him should he fall from grace again.

And finally, with El Fatah, the Black September Hand goes along with the idea of establishing a Jordan-Palestinian Republic, and hence with abolishing the monarchy.

With the remainder of the Islamic Fatah founded long ago by Amin el Husseini, the former Mufti of Jerusalem, the secret committee is bitterly hostile to the lodges, and this adds to its hatred for King Hussein, who is an upper-degree member of the Scottish Rite masons in Great Britain.

Black September and its ruling "hand" are not sworn vassals to Marxism, despite a certain flavor in their rhetoric. But no more are they part of the traditional Arab right, since their thrust runs against international capitalism as well. What is more, it is unquestionably this position outside the expected patterns that enables the phoney fights between East and West to continue, thus threatening to cut short the existence of Black September. On both sides of the barricades, the people who pull the strings would very much like to see the revolution, or several revolutions. Provided, that is, that they are still pulling the strings.

However, it is also the size and strength of the international backup systems which the secret committee enjoys which, paradoxically, threaten the survival of Black September. Because of a handful of "people of good will" won over in the West, the organization was apparently blinded to the degree of second-thought "decay" that had attacked the internationalist network it had counted on until now. Discreet though the recruiting effort was within the "support committees" set up in our countries to "help Palestine," it was inevitable that these networks should have been infiltrated by informers who were far more interested in the ways their own movements could exploit Black September: or even, in the case of pro-Soviet elements, in penetrating these networks so that, at the proper moment, they could commit "indiscretions" which would provoke police action.

Be that as it may, here are some details about these other organizations.

In France

Here the rank and file support for Black September comes mainly from the remnants of the network of intellectuals, university people, progressive priests, and the like, who used to work for the Algerian FLN. There are several veterans from the

Jeanson apparatus, "Abbé" Robert Davezies, his friends in "Jeune Resistance," and the group led by Henri Curiel. Another is reporter Paul-Albert Lentin, who in 1960 and 1961 set up several secret contacts between Mr Bernard Tricot, then an adviser to President de Gaulle, and the secret apparatus of the Communist Party and the clandestine organization of the FLN on the other part.

Under cover of exhibits organized in Europe in the summer of 1971 and called "Palestine Weeks," the secret committee did intensive recruiting for its own secret networks, particularly among members of "Secours Rouge," "Revolution," "Lutte Ouvriere," "Ligue Communiste," the "Front des Jeunes Progressistes" (left-wing Gaullists), and in the left wing of the PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié: Unified Socialist Party].

The secret committee's contact points in Paris include: La Librairie Palestinienne, at 24 Rue de la Reunion, the headquarters of the magazine Africasia at 37 Rue de Bassano, the offices of the Arab League, etc. These contacts are invariably covered by missions for such official organizations as El Fatah, FPLP, FPDLP, etc.

In Belgium

There are drops at Brussels, Namur, Flawinne, and Fali-solle. Francis Dessart, the newsman and secretary-general of the Unified Socialist Front (which is allied with Krivine's Communist League) is not the last man to be in "sympathy" with the aims of Black September.

In Italy

Rome and Milan are two essential bases, opened in 1971 with the direct backing of billionaire publisher Feltrinelli. It was he who brought into the circle attorney G.B. Lazagna, architect Ciruzzi, Vittorio Togliatti (Palmiro's nephew), and Maria Calimodio, Palmiro Togliatti's ex-wife. Meanwhile in Milan, Arturo Schwartz, of the Trotskyite "Redis" group, knowingly or not, like all who had gone before him, offered his support to the Black September organization.

In Switzerland

Zurich and Lausanne are the two most useful centers for the "Coordinating Committee" run by Abou Jihad, under the cover of something called the "Committee for Support to Arab Palestine," and thanks to the systematic penetration of the Arab-Swiss Association.

In Great Britain

It has been common knowledge for 2 years that 32 Labour MPs have been won over to the Palestinians, including Cristopher Mayhew and old syndicalist Margaret McKay. Some of these people even now support Black September. None of them, in any case, has spoken out against its action in Munich. However, it is Peter Hain, president of the Young Liberals, and his friends, Tariq Ali, the well-known Pakistani, and Iraqi Fawzi Ibrahim, who bestir themselves most on behalf of Palestinians tied in with Black September. The latter two have their own contacts with leftist circles in the IRA [Irish Republican Army].

In the United States

The natural-born pillars of Black September are veterans of the Weathermen, the Black Panthers, and sundry cadres from the American-Arab university students' association.

In Federal Germany

The police had firm knowledge that the secret committee was actively recruiting, and had been for 2 years, among an Arab colony numbering almost 75,000, 3,500 of whom are natives of Palestine. But the fix was in from high places until the Hamburg sabotage, the Cologne murders (6 Jordanians at a single stroke), and finally the Munich affair. There was continuing protection from the "Juso," the youth wing of the Social Democrat Party, and even on the party's executive council and that of the Liberal-Democrat Party, many of whose MPs are known to have backed the Algerian FLN networks, and, until early 1972, those of the Palestinians. On the fringes, the "activists" in the anarchist "Baader Gang" maintained contacts with Black September until their group was broken up, and records seized by the police would have indicated the taking of a little more precautionary measures during the Olympic Games.

The Terrorist Internationale and the Pipelines

According to the testimony of several policemen, we find that on the first 2 days after the Games began, they had only to do their jobs, being on the alert for possible incidents, for certain newsmen and even some athletes to insult them and call them "nazis." Was this purposely done to get a relaxation of security?

As a whole, the Black September Hand belongs to a new terrorist internationale which owes allegiance to nobody, though it does maintain contacts with everybody. Several plane high-jackings, including the one that recently brought it \$35 million, plus its drug trafficking, provide -- irregularly -- financing for the organization. It has its contacts in the West, via Zurich, with other foreign groups: with the ALT [Turkish Liberation Army], with a Kurdish faction of the same coloration, and with the "Red Army" in Japan, and with the Uruguayan Tupamaros. Again through Zurich, it has ties with one wing of the IRA, etc.

The organization's arsenal is a mixed bag, drawn from the stores of Palestinian organizations, mainly Fatah. But, for example, some delayed-action grenades were made in Zwickau in East Germany, and the submachineguns come from Prague.

The next action planned has to do with the European pipelines, but, if they succeed, the ones in Iran and Saudi Arabia will come first. This is why last June and July three or four commandos of five experts each slipped into those countries, and are waiting for D-day to act. The man who heads the operation in Iran is called Mazin Abou Nirhi. We were unable to discover whether that was his real name or a nom de guerre. For 9 weeks the Iranian secret police have been combing the country, hoping to catch him. In Europe, the oil companies have been on the alert since the beginning of September, and their informants inside the support network are sweating to find out which targets Black September has chosen for its pipeline strikes.

LES SECRETS DE "SEPTEMBRE NOIR"

(La couverture, cette semaine)

Le drame sanglant de Munich, le 6 septembre dernier, n'aurait pas dû surprendre. Plusieurs ambassades occidentales et de nombreux directeurs de sociétés, banques et groupes d'affaires ont pu lire dès octobre 1970, dans un bulletin confidentiel édité en Belgique, que venait d'être fondé, à l'intérieur des organisations palestiniennes, un « Comité central clandestin pour la libération de la Palestine » ou CCCLP, « décidé à s'appuyer à la fois sur Pékin et Moscou, mais sans en dépendre », et à mener son combat à l'échelle internationale.

Ce bulletin, « La Lettre de Bruxelles », a parfois soulevé le scepticisme lorsqu'en décembre 1971, janvier, mars et mai 1972 il annonçait, à la suite de l'assassinat au Caire du Premier ministre jordanien Wasfi Tall, que le CCCLP disposait d'un petit nombre d'hommes de commandos, mais d'une vaste toile de support pour son organisation de tueurs, dans nos pays. Et qu'il frapperait chaque fois que l'on croirait proche un retour à la paix en Orient arabe. Les sabotages d'oléoducs y furent annoncés — sauf naturellement le lieu choisi en ultime instance — tels ceux survenus à Trieste en août dernier, de même que d'éventuels sabotages sur des cargos commerçant de près ou de loin avec Israël.

Munich était donc prévisible, comme l'avaient été en leur temps, pour frapper l'opinion internationale, les incidents sanglants qui troublèrent les Jeux Olympiques de Mexico, par le fait des « frères » sud-américains du terrorisme palestinien.

Nous avons pu reprendre et compléter ces enquêtes sans vouloir porter de jugements sur le fond. En relevant simplement qu'Israël a le droit de réclamer des garanties pour sa sécurité comme n'importe quel Etat au monde, et que le peuple palestinien a droit à la justice, mais qu'il l'aurait peut-être obtenue déjà n'était la façon dont usent et abusent du malheur des autres certains « inspirateurs » et « réseaux de soutien » qui ne voient dans les déceptions et révoltes d'autrui qu'un moyen de semer par lui le sang et le désordre.

Naissance de « Septembre noir »

L'appellation CCCLP n'est pas formelle. Ceux qui ont fondé ce Comité secret, il y a deux ans, provenaient simplement de presque toutes les formations agissant alors en ou hors de Palestine : une douzaine d'hommes d'action de moins de 35 ans, lassés des querelles théoriques, déçus par le marxisme ou par l'extrême-droite, refusant les compromis que dicterait une entente Est-Ouest dans une sorte de petit Yalta à l'échelle israélo-arabe. Il fut décidé que chacun resterait cadre ou militant de son organisation d'origine, que son adhésion au « Comité » resterait secrète et en serait responsable sur sa vie.

L'un des fondateurs du Comité, dont « Septembre noir » est issu l'année suivante, c'est-à-dire au seuil de l'automne 1971, fut Salah Khalaf, de son nom de guerre Abou Ali Yyad. Jusqu'alors ce géant borgne commandait en Jordanie les commandos de choc de l'OLP. Il a succombé en juillet 1971, dans les grottes de Jerash, aux coups des unités jordaniennes. Aussitôt sa sœur, sorte de passionaria dévouée à la cause, décida de le venger et prit contact avec plusieurs des fondateurs du Comité secret. De leurs conciliabules est né « La Main de Septembre noir » qui signa, quelques semaines plus tard, l'exécution de Wasfi Tall. « La Main » parce que suivant les principes des organisations secrètes sérieuses, chaque cellule ne compte que cinq membres, et un seul d'entre eux a le contact avec un des cadres voisins.

Ce groupe d'action disposait fin 1971 d'une toile internationale déjà importante. Pendant un an, les dirigeants du Comité secret avaient profité de leurs fonctions officielles, au sein des Organisations classiques palestiniennes, c'est-à-dire de leurs missions dans les pays arabes ou en Europe, pour recruter sur trois plans : côté palestinien proprement dit, pour constituer des chaînes de cellules parmi les étudiants, émigrés, travailleurs, etc.; côté « Comités de soutien à la Palestine »; enfin parmi les ambassades arabes, bureaux de la Ligue arabe dans le monde, et aussi bien dans les ambassades et bureaux des pays du Maghreb.

Ainsi s'explique la façon dont à Londres, Milan, Trieste, Hambourg, Cologne, Rotterdam, etc., « Septembre noir » a pu frapper ces dix derniers mois, commettant une quinzaine d'attentats, sabotages, enlèvements qui, sans compter l'affaire de Munich, avaient déjà fait une trentaine de morts à l'étranger, et presque autant de blessés.

La plupart des chefs des 50 ou 60 commandos de cinq personnes dont dispose « Septembre noir » ont été formés à Pékin, Moscou, Alger ou en Allemagne de l'Est et Corée du Nord, ces cinq ou six dernières années. Ils constituent une sorte de collégialité qui n'a pas de centre fixe où siègerait un état-major, ce qui permet de comprendre l'espèce d'insaisissabilité de l'organisation. Son seul organe permanent est un « Comité de coordination » dans lequel siège, vraisemblablement comme haut responsable, Ahmed Djebril, ex-officier syrien, longtemps chef du « Front pour la libération de la Palestine - Commandement général » (FLP), et qui se fait souvent appeler Abou Jihad.

La « Main de Septembre noir » a profité depuis 24 mois de toutes les rancoeurs et de toutes les dissidences qui ont secoué les Organisations palestiniennes,

réduites à quatre Mouvements officiels aujourd'hui. Le recrutement n'a pas manqué d'être aussi facilité par la conjonction suivante :

— avec le Front populaire démocratique pour la libération de la Palestine (FPDLP) de Naïef Hawatmeh, « Septembre noir » se prononce pour « une approche de classe » des problèmes arabo-israéliens et internationaux;

avec le Front populaire ou FPLP de Georges Habbache, il est partisan des actions directes : détournements d'avions, terrorisme « sélectif », etc. Mais G. Habbache, depuis longtemps dépendant de Moscou — il s'y trouve depuis le 29 août et non depuis le 5 septembre comme on l'a écrit — s'est rallié en mars dernier au principe de la « reconversion » des groupes palestiniens en « Front uni », politique, abandonnant provisoirement l'action directe. Ce qui a suscité une coupure en deux du FPLP, avec Waddi Haddad, son chef des opérations extérieures, basculant vers « Septembre noir », et Ghassan Kanafani et Abou Chebab, se rangeant derrière Habbache, et condamnant ouvertement l'action directe. En juillet dernier, un mystérieux attentat, imputé à Israël ou à la Jordanie, a frappé Kanafani. En réalité « Septembre noir » lançait un avertissement sans frais à un personnage susceptible de trahir ce qu'il connaissait des plans du Comité secret, d'autant que sa femme est danoise et, selon « Septembre noir », reste attachée aux principes occidentaux.

La série de colis pièges expédiés aux ambassades et missions d'Israël, ou en Israël même, entre fin novembre 1971 et février 1972, depuis des villes européennes, provenaient de « Septembre noir », qui ne signe cependant que les actions qui lui semblent importantes.

Yasser Arafat, le « patron » des organisations palestiniennes officielles, connaît assez la force prise par le Comité secret pour garder une attitude prudente à son égard. C'est pourquoi il n'a pas condamné l'attentat de Munich. Naïef Hawatmeh l'avait fait en février 1972, en critiquant « le spontanéisme » de « Septembre noir ». Il s'est tu depuis, sachant fort bien le sort qui risque de l'atteindre, s'il récidivait.

— Avec le Fath enfin, la « Main de Septembre noir » est d'accord pour l'instauration d'une République jordano-palestinienne, donc pour l'abolition de la royauté.

— Avec les rescapés du Fath islamique autrefois fondé par Amine El Husseini, l'ancien Mufti de Jérusalem, le Comité secret est vivement hostile aux loges, et ceci ajoute à sa haine du roi Hussein, qui appartient à un des degrés du rite écossais, en Grande-Bretagne.

« Septembre noir » et sa « Main » directrice ne sont donc pas inféodés au marxisme, malgré une certaine phraséologie, mais ne le sont pas non plus à la droite arabe classique puisque le combat vise aussi bien le capitalisme international. C'est d'ailleurs sans doute cette position hors des schémas dont vivent et survivent les faux combats entre l'Est et l'Ouest qui risque d'écourter l'existence de « Septembre noir ». Des deux côtés de la barricade, les tireurs de ficelles veulent bien « la » ou « des » révolutions. A condition qu'ils les contrôlent.

Mais c'est aussi l'importance des réseaux de soutien internationaux dont bénéficie le Comité secret qui, paradoxalement, menace la survie de « Septembre noir ». Pour quelques bonnes volontés sincèrement acquises en Occident, l'Organisation n'a pas vu, semble-t-il, à quel point la toile « internationaliste » sur laquelle elle a jusqu'à présent compté est « pourrie » d'arrière-pensées. Si discret qu'il ait été le recrutement à l'intérieur des « Comités de soutien » fondés dans nos pays pour « aider la Palestine », il est inévitable que se soient infiltrés dans ces réseaux des « indicateurs » qui s'intéressent bien plus aux moyens dont, par « Septembre noir », pourra profiter leur propre mouvement : ou même, s'agissant d'éléments prosoviétiques, à la pénétration de ces réseaux pour, au moment voulu, commettre des « indiscretions » qui provoquent l'action de la police.

Voici, quoi qu'il en soit, quelques précisions sur ces réseaux.

— En France, la base aidant « Septembre noir » provient en majorité des anciens réseaux d'intellectuels, universitaires, prêtres progressistes, etc., qui autrefois travaillaient pour le FLN algérien. Ainsi divers anciens du réseau Jeanson, « l'abbé » Robert Davezies, ses amis de « Jeune Résistance » et du groupe animé par Henri Curiel. Ainsi le journaliste Paul-Albert Lentin, qui en 1960-1961 fit diverses liaisons secrètes entre M. Bernard Tricot, alors conseiller du président de Gaulle, d'une part, l'appareil secret du Parti communiste, et l'appareil clandestin FLN d'autre part.

— Sous couvert des expositions organisées en Europe en été 1971, et appelées « Semaines pour la Palestine », le Comité secret a recruté pour ses propres réseaux de soutien. Notamment auprès de « Secours rouge », « Révolution », « Lutte ouvrière », « Ligue communiste », le « Front des jeunes progressistes » (gaullistes de gauche) et dans l'aile gauche du PSU.

— Les points de contacts du Comité secret à Paris sont en particulier « La Librairie palestinienne », 24 rue de la

Réunion, les locaux de la revue « Africasia », 37 rue de Bassano, le bureau de la Ligue arabe, etc. Toujours sous couvert de missions au compte des Organisations officielles, Fath, FPLP, FPDLP, etc.

— En Belgique, à Bruxelles, Namur, Flawinne, Falisolle, fonctionnent des boîtes aux lettres. Le journaliste et secrétaire général du Front socialiste unifié (lié à la Ligue communiste de Krivine), Francis Dessart n'est pas le dernier à « sympathiser » avec les buts de « Septembre noir ».

— En Italie, Rome et Milan sont deux « bases » essentielles, ouvertes en 1971 grâce à l'appui direct de l'éditeur milliardaire Feltrinelli, qui amena dans le « circuit » l'avocat G.B. Lazagna, l'architecte Ciruzzi, Vittorio Togliatti, neveu de Palmiro, et Maria Calimodio, épouse de Palmiro Togliatti. Parallèlement à Milan, Arturo Schwarz, du groupe trotskyste « Redis », sciemment ou non comme tous les précédents, a offert son appui à l'organisation « Septembre noir ».

— En Suisse, Zurich et Lausanne sont les deux « centres » les plus utiles au « Comité de coordination » d'Abou Jihad, sous l'abri du « Comité de soutien à la Palestine arabe », et grâce au noyautage systématique de l'Association arabo-suisse.

— En Grande-Bretagne, il est bien connu depuis deux ans que trente-deux députés travaillistes sont acquis aux Palestiniens, dont Christopher Mayhew et la vieille syndicaliste Margaret McKay. Quelques-uns de ces personnages soutiennent jusqu'à présent « Septembre noir ». Aucun n'a en tout cas condamné l'action de Munich. C'est cependant Peter Hain, président des jeunes libéraux, et ses amis Tariq Ali, le Pakistanais bien connu, et Faouzi Ibrahim, Irakien, qui s'agitent le plus en faveur de Palestiniens liés à « Septembre noir », ces deux derniers ayant de leur côté des liaisons dans les milieux gauchistes de l'IRA.

— Aux Etats-Unis, les piliers naturels de « Septembre noir » sont les vétérans des Weathermen, des Black Panthers et divers cadres de l'Association universitaire américano-arabe.

— En Allemagne fédérale, la police savait pertinemment que le Comité secret recrutait activement depuis deux ans dans une colonie arabe de près de 75.000 personnes dont 3.500 sont des Palestiniens d'origine. Mais de hautes protections jouaient, aussi longtemps que n'avaient pas eu lieu les sabotages de Hambourg, les assassinats de Cologne (six Jordaniens d'un coup), puis finalement l'affaire de Munich. Protections permanentes parmi les « Juso », ou Jeunes du parti social-démocrate, et jus-

que dans la direction même du SPD et du Parti libéral-démocrate, où l'on sait que de nombreux députés soutenaient autrefois les réseaux du FLN algérien, et jusqu'au début de 1972, ceux des Palestiniens. En marge, les « activistes » de l'anarchique « Bande à Baader » entretenaient des contacts avec « Septembre noir », jusqu'au démantèlement de leur groupe, et les notes saisies par la police auraient justifié qu'on prit un peu plus de précautions au moment des Jeux Olympiques.

L'internationale terroriste et les oléoducs

A la décharge de certains policiers, relevons qu'aux deux premiers jours de l'ouverture des Jeux, il suffisait qu'ils fassent leur métier, en prévision d'incidents possibles, pour que certains journalistes, et même des sportifs, les injurient en les traitant de « nazis ». Etait-ce pour obtenir un relâchement de la sécurité?...

Au total, la « Main de Septembre noir » se rattache à une nouvelle internationale terroriste qui ne doit rien à personne, si elle entretient des contacts avec tout le monde. Divers détournements d'avion, dont celui qui dernièrement lui a procuré 35 millions de dollars, des trafics de drogue assurent le financement — irrégulièrement d'ailleurs — de « l'organisation ». Celle-ci a des contacts en Occident, via Zurich, avec d'autres groupes étrangers : avec l'Armée de libération turque (ALT); avec une fraction kurde de même tendance, et avec l'« Armée rouge » au Japon, avec les Tupamaros uruguayens. Par Zurich encore avec une aile de l'IRA etc.

L'armement est très divers et puisé dans les stocks des organisations palestiniennes, surtout du Fatah. Mais, par exemple, certaines grenades à retardement ont été fabriquées à Zwickau, en Allemagne orientale, et les mitraillettes viennent de Prague.

Les prochaines actions prévues concernent les oléoducs européens, mais, à plus court terme, si elles réussissent, ceux d'Iran et d'Arabie séoudite. C'est pourquoi en juin et juillet derniers, trois ou quatre commandos de cinq spécialistes se sont infiltrés dans ces pays, attendant le jour J pour agir. Le responsable de l'opération, en Iran, s'appelle — nom de guerre ou authentique, nous n'avons pu contrôler — Mazin Abou Nirhi. Depuis neuf semaines, la police secrète iranienne remue le pays pour tenter de l'arrêter. En Europe, les sociétés de pétrole sont en alerte depuis début septembre, et les indicateurs font du zèle, à l'intérieur des réseaux de soutien, pour tenter de découvrir les objectifs choisis par « Septembre noir ».

Eastern Europe

Wednesday, Oct. 18, 1972 THE WASHINGTON POST

Tito Attacks Serbian Leaders

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

BELGRADE, Oct. 17—President Tito of Yugoslavia has disclosed that he is at odds with some of the leading officials of the largest regional party in the country, the Serbian League of Communists.

His confirmation of the rift suggested to Yugoslav sources that the 80-year-old president may have run into resistance in his campaign to mold the national Communist Party

into an integrated organization.

The six republics that make up Yugoslavia were once subjected to absolute centralized rule. But about four years ago, Tito undertook to decentralize both the country's economic and political institutions. As a result, the Communist parties in the republics became more independent and more involved in promoting regional interests.

Though Tito has maintained support for some degree of local autonomy, he has said

that he opposes "decentralizing the League of Communists," the national Communist Party.

For the past 18 months, he has been pressing for a party shake-up that would unify and establish the national party as a disciplined institution capable of keeping peace between Yugoslavia's diverse republics and nations.

However, with regard to Serbia, the largest Yugoslav republic, "the battle has just begun," one official said.

Declaring that "Tito is no

dictator," another official said that despite his immense prestige, it was uncertain whether the Serbian organization would now adopt major personnel and policy changes. Tito left this up to the republic's Central Committee.

Excerpts of Tito's remarks to Serbian party officials last week were released last night after a delay of several days. Tito was quoted as saying the situation in the regional party was "not good" and "unhealthy."

Since the ouster of Serbian strongman and Yugoslav police boss Aleksander Rankovic in 1966, the regional party has moved away from its traditional role as a vehicle for Serbian political domination of Yugoslav politics and concentrated more on economic problems.

According to some, however, President Tito was referring to the Serbian party when he said in an interview Oct. 7 that "It happens that in some Republic they are isolated within their own circle as if the [national] League of Communists didn't exist."

Last November, after a meeting between Tito and the leaders of the Republic of Croatia, followed by a tough speech, a sweeping purge began of the Croatian party, and it is still continuing.

By contrast, the excerpts of Tito's remarks to the Serbs seemed more cautious. However, he hinted that the meeting had led to sharp disagreements.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 October 1972

Tito Apparently the Victor In Dispute With Serbians

By RAYMOND H. ANDERSON
Special to The New York Times

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, Oct. 17—After weeks of behind-the-scenes conflict, President Tito appeared today to have outmaneuvered the leadership of the Communist party in Serbia in a dispute about political and economic power in the six Yugoslav republics.

The Yugoslav press published Marshal Tito's complaints against the Serbian party leadership, delivered during a four-day secret meeting in Belgrade last week.

Marshal Tito, who has been head of the Yugoslav Communist party for 25 years, accused the Serbian leaders of having followed separate, self-serving policies that were in conflict with the other republics. He made it clear that the Serbian party's Central Committee would be expected to change its leadership at its next meeting.

Rumors About Chairman

The chairman of the Serbian party's Central Committee is Marko Nikezic, a former Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the United States. Mr. Nikezic, who is 51 years old and a member of the party since he was 19, was elected to the Serbian party post in 1968.

Rumors have circulated in Belgrade all summer that Marshal Tito was displeased with Mr. Nikezic and the Serbian party's actions. The dispute came to public attention nine

days ago in a Tito interview with the Zagreb newspaper Vjesnik. Without giving names, the President complained that "certain people from unsound intellectual environments" were resisting party policy and efforts to tighten party discipline. The remark was widely interpreted as aimed at Mr. Nikezic, who was a member of the pre-war intelligentsia.

Protest by Leader

In his speech at the secret meetings, Marshal Tito emphasized that arbitrary changes would not be imposed in the Serbian leadership. He reportedly told the Serbs:

"I think you will agree that at such meetings as this, outside the regular forums, there cannot be any question of any personnel shifts in the leading bodies. Only your forums are competent to do that. It is your problem, the problem of your Central Committee."

By implication, President Tito accused the Serbs of having sought a privileged role in the Yugoslav federation of 21 million people, in which the 8.5 million Serbs constitute the largest republic.

The Yugoslav leader reportedly protested that a "concentration of capital," large banks and powerful wholesale trade organizations in Serbia had stimulated nationalist resentments and distrust in the five other republics.

Last winter, nationalist disturbances in the republic of Croatia were touched off by economic complaints against Serbia. A major objective of Marshal Tito's reforms is to

LOS ANGELES TIMES
25 September 1972

4 DEFECTORS REACH WEST ---UNDER BUS

VIENNA (AP) — Four Czechoslovaks, three men and a woman, defected to the West Saturday morning by strapping themselves to the rear axle of the Bratislava-Vienna bus on its daily three-hour run.

"All of a sudden four people came crawling from under the bus and ran away fast," an official of the downtown bus terminal reported Sunday.

A Vienna newspaper, reporting the case, said the refugees reported to police several hours later and asked for political asylum.

hold Yugoslavia together by centralizing economic and administrative power, giving the republics control over everything but foreign affairs and military defense.

President Tito charged that the Serbs were displaying lenient "liberalism in court action against nationalists and in press coverage of nationalist challenges. This has provoked distrust in mutual relations between party forums in Serbia and in Yugoslavia in general, he stressed.

WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1972

Soviet Amnesty

MOSCOW — A general amnesty for thousands of imprisoned criminals will be declared shortly in connection with the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet Union, Communist sources said. Invitations will be sent to President Nixon and other non-Communist heads of state to attend anniversary celebrations on Dec. 30.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 October 1972

TITO, AT 80, TRIES TO REBUILD PARTY

Ousters in the 6 Yugoslav
Republics May Be Near

By RAYMOND H. ANDERSON
Special to The New York Times

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, Oct. 13—A mood of a gathering political storm is building up in Yugoslavia as President Tito, who is 80 years old and conscious of diminishing time, is striving to rebuild the reform-weakened Communist organization as a tightly disciplined authority to hold the country together after he leaves power. Ousters of party officials in some of the country's six republics appear imminent. They have been accused of defying or ignoring his leadership.

At the same time, as part of renewed emphasis on Yugoslavia as a working-class society, measures are being debated to curb a new prosperous class that has benefited most from what students have begun to denounce as a "petit-bourgeois consumer society."

For several weeks, Marshal Tito and other leaders have been speaking throughout Yugoslavia in an accelerating campaign to revitalize the League of Communists, as the party has been called since decentralization reforms in 1952.

In an interview published Sunday in the Zagreb newspaper Vjesnik, President Tito declared that Yugoslavia had reached a "turning point" in Socialist development. "We need an avant-garde party," he was quoted as having said. "And this means that there can be no room in it for those who have absolutely nothing in common with Socialism or with Communism, those who joined the party because of careerism."

Party Termed Too Large
Marshal Tito said that the party had become too large with a million members—one out of every 21 Yugoslavs—and could be reduced by several hundred thousand.

In particular, he condemned a "euphoria of democratization" that developed in the party after its Sixth Congress in 1952. The name was changed to League of Communists at the congress to symbolize its reduction from a commanding role to one of "education and persuasion."

A major objective of the reforms in 1952 was to contrast expanding freedoms in Marxist Yugoslavia with the Stalinist repression in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries in Eastern Europe, enraging foes of the Tito regime at the time.

In the Vjesnik interview, Marshal Tito asserted that the democratization had gone too far, weakening the party for

struggle against the "class enemy." But he stressed that there would be no regression to Stalinism.

The major demonstration of the party's frailty came last winter during an outburst of nationalist and separatist sentiment in the republic of Croatia. The party proved unable to cope with the challenge, and Marshal Tito warned that he would order military intervention if necessary.

The outbreak of Croatian nationalism emphasized the urgent need for a strong nationwide political authority, besides Marshal Tito, to stand above the country's many nationalities.

"The party must be the cohesive force in each republic, the force of the monolithic nature of our Socialist country," he said in the interview.

In recent months, increasing expression has been given to a wide variety of grievances that seem to strengthen sentiment for a stronger party authority—nationalism, inflation, growing distinctions between rich and poor, economic provincialism and protectionism in some republics, and an upsurge of church activity among young people.

Even the press has come under attack for "negative articles" about Yugoslavia and for circulation-building photographs of nude women and attention to glamorous and wealthy people.

Last week, Dusan Dragosavac, Deputy Secretary of the Executive Committee, Croatian League of Communists, complained that the "working people and their achievements" had disappeared from Yugoslav publications.

Against this background of discontent, Marshal Tito declared that priority action was essential to reinstate the party's authority and to force "unity of ideas and action."

Disunity, he charged, is being fomented by "certain people in certain forums in our country." He stressed that a generation gap had emerged in the Yugoslav leadership between the anti-Nazi partisan veterans of a quarter of a century ago and younger, upcoming officials.

The partisans "have the same outlook," Marshal Tito stressed. "But there are people coming from unsound intellectual environments, the non-Socialist intelligentsia," he complained, without giving names. "They are the one who offer resistance."

Marshal Tito expressed dismay that disunity had been eroding the revolutionary achievements he had fought and worked for over the last 50 years.

"I have been fighting for so many years," he told the Vjesnik interviewer. "If I could do so, I would gladly have a rest now. It would be high time for me to have a rest. But as you see, I must work. Just for this reason I would like to consolidate our country so we can be certain about its proper Socialist development."

NEW YORK TIMES
18 October 1972

6 JEWISH SCIENTISTS PROTEST IN MOSCOW

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17—Six Soviet Jewish scientists in Moscow telephoned a message to the president of the National Academy of Sciences here today protesting their treatment in the Soviet Union and the refusal of the Soviet Government to permit their immigration to Israel.

The message, in the form of an open letter, was received by Dr. David Korn, chairman of the Soviet Jewry Committee of the Jewish Community Council here and professor of Russian studies at Howard University.

Dr. Korn said he transmitted the message to the National Academy and its president, Dr. Philip Handler.

In their message, the six scientists said that their situation was "getting graver each day," that they were being "isolated from the outside world" and that their families were being "both openly and secretly oppressed by the Soviet authorities." They said that they were not permitted to work in their specialties but were forced to do manual labor.

The six scientists asked Dr. Handler to convey their message to Prof. M. V. Keldysh, president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, who is now in Washington. "We ask you to discuss with him the measures he can and must take to protect our basic human rights," they said.

Dr. Korn identified the scientists and their fields of specialization as Prof. David Asbel, physics; Prof. Aleksandr Lerner, cybernetics; Prof. Benjamin Levich, biophysics; Prof. Boris Molsheson, mathematics; Dr. Roman Rutman, cybernetics, and Prof. Aleksandr Voronel, physics.

WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1972

Top Soviet Scientist Speaks Here

The president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences addressed America's National Academy of Sciences yesterday in a secret session from which even staff members were banned.

The closed-door talk marked the beginning of a 21-day coast-to-coast tour of American scientific and space installations by Mstislav V. Keldysh, head of the Soviet Academy, and five other Soviet Scientists who accompanied him here.

This is Keldysh's first visit to the United States. Officials at the National Academy of Sciences withheld any announcement of the visit in order to discourage demonstrations.

Keldysh, 61, is an outstanding scientist in the field of mathematics and applied mechanics. He is the organizer of Russia's space program and was invited here by Dr. Philip Handler, president of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, whom he had met at science meetings in Europe.

New York Times
18 Oct. 1972

Big Crowds in Belgrade Greet Queen Elizabeth

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, Oct. 17 (Reuters)—Thousands of Yugoslavs thronged flag-decked streets today to give Queen Elizabeth of Britain a welcome to Belgrade.

The crowds packed sidewalks four to five deep in places to watch the Queen and President Tito drive by in an open car on their way from Surcin Airport to the Byzantine-style palace on Dedinje Hill where the Queen and her party will stay.

The Queen, accompanied by Prince Philip and their 22-year-old daughter, Princess Anne, received a red-carpet greeting at the airport from Marshal Tito, his wife and high Yugoslav officials.

The Queen, making her first visit to a Communist country, is spending two days in Belgrade before starting a 780-mile tour that will take her to some of Yugoslavia's most popular scenic areas.

NEW YORK TIMES 18 October 1972 POLES SIGN PACT ON PREWAR BONDS

U.S. Holders to Get Interest at a Lower Rate Pending a Settlement Accord

By KATHLEEN TELTSCHE

Poland has agreed to work out a plan for settling about \$41-million in bonds dating from the 1920's.

The securities are held by at least 10,000 people, many of them Polish-Americans in the Chicago, New York and Buffalo areas. A number of the owners apparently regarded them as nearly worthless, since the bonds were selling for less than 9 per cent of their face value earlier this year.

Under an agreement signed yesterday, the Polish Government has agreed to pay interest at a low rate for the next two years and, after the holders have been identified, to work out the precise method for a permanent settlement in 1975.

All prewar Polish bonds publicly offered on the American market are covered by the agreement, according to George D. Woods, president of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, who negotiated the terms with a Polish group headed by Stanislaw Kosicki of the Polish Ministry of Finance.

The bondholders' council was set up in 1933 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who selected a group of prominent citizens to serve on the non-profit group that has managed to secure agreements totalling \$3.5-billion. In 1960 Yugoslavia became the first Eastern European country to settle prewar debts. Hungary, Rumania, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria have not settled defaulted bonds. There also are the unpaid debts incurred by China that predate the war between the Nationalists and the Communists.

"We were Poland's last creditor," Mr. Woods remarked after the interim agreement was concluded and he had signed it in the name of the bondholders' council.

The Polish bonds were purchased during an era when foreign bonds sold widely among United States ethnic groups. Some bought them for sentiment and others for investment. It has been estimated that more than \$10-billion worth of foreign bonds were sold in this country in the nineteen-twenties.

Whether holders of the Polish bonds will recover the face

value is uncertain and will have to be decided as part of the permanent settlement, Mr. Woods said.

"No one knows how many bonds will be recovered or how many have been lost or destroyed," Mr. Woods said. The older generation, which purchased the bonds, has died off in many instances and some in the younger generation regarded them as worthless, he said.

One local purchaser of bonds in the 1920's was the St. Aloysius Young Men's Catholic Club of St. Stanislaw Kostka Church in Brooklyn.

The 75-year-old club purchased \$300 worth of bonds, its treasurer, Frederick Lupenowicz, said, "to help out the Polish people." Mr. Lupenowicz said that club members long ago had decided that they were not going to get their money from their purchase. "But we held on to them anyway," he said. "They're in our safe."

The negotiations concerning the Polish bonds have been going on quietly since early September but American authorities have been reluctant to discuss their progress.

However, increased trading in the bonds on the New York Stock Exchange suggested that speculators were expecting a settlement.

The bonds, which had been selling as low as 8½ per cent of face value, began climbing significantly early in September, reaching a high of 33 before leveling off at about 29 per cent.

All of the bonds are bearer bonds, not registered and consequently there would be no reimbursement if the certificates had disappeared.

Efforts to locate the holders of the Polish bonds will be made partly through lists compiled by the council and through advertisements in the Polish-language press, Mr. Woods said. But he added that word quickly spread within a community when such events occurred.

The interim agreement was reached after 13 meetings between the Polish negotiators and the council, 17 signed at Mr. Woods's office at the First Boston Corporation, an investment concern, at 277 Park Avenue.

Under the terms, on or before July 1, 1973, Polish authorities will offer holders of Polish Government and Government-guaranteed prewar dollar bonds an interim plan for settlement.

Holders will be asked to accept by depositing their bonds with a paying agent to be named by Polish authorities. All such bonds will draw 1½ per cent interest for the period between July 1, 1973, and June 30, 1974, and 2 per cent for the succeeding 12 months.

Also, by next July the Polish authorities will announce their intention to negotiate with the council on a permanent settlement to go into effect July 1, 1975.

Recommends Acceptance

The council will recommend to the bondholders that they

NEW YORK TIMES
14 October 1972

Soviet's Grain Shortage Brings Readjustments in the East Bloc

By JAMES FERON

Special to The New York Times

WARSAW, Oct. 13 — The Soviet Union's poor harvest and heavy purchases of Western grains and other foods are apparently having a considerable effect on Eastern Europe. Some Communist bloc nations are selling to the Soviet Union to help fill the shortages while others are negotiating for purchases of grain to replace supplies normally provided by Moscow.

The Eastern European buyers, apparently as unaware this summer as the Western countries of the extent of Soviet harvest problems, are faced now with the higher world prices as a result of the heavy Soviet purchases.

Poland, for example, has apparently agreed to sell a record total of a million tons of potatoes to the Soviet Union, but she is also shopping for wheat to insure her own supplies this winter.

According to experts here, Moscow has been supplying Poland with about 1.5-million tons of wheat each year under a long-term obligation. Poland grows wheat and had a record harvest this year, but she needs the types of grain necessary for bread.

Czechoslovakia and East Germany, similarly, are purchasers of Soviet wheat although they have occasionally supplemented these shipments with purchases in Western markets. There is some uncertainty this year,

however, over the quantity and quality Moscow will be able to provide.

Some experts consider it likely that some of the 25-million tons of wheat purchased by the Soviet Union this summer, roughly half of it from the United States, could be unloaded at Polish or East German ports to fulfill obligations.

It is understood, meanwhile, that Polish officials shopping for extra supplies are unhappy over the higher prices created by the heavy Soviet purchases in the United States and are exploring other markets.

These could include Yugoslavia, Rumania and even Hungary. But their supplies are limited. Major grain producers such as Australia, Argentina and Canada have had mediocre harvests or, are fulfilling other commitments, including those to the Soviet Union.

Western Europe produces wheat, but not enough of the types of grains required for milling purposes. Thus the major available supplies remain in American silos.

Maintaining adequate food supplies in the Communist world often has political as well as nutritional implications. The riots in Poland nearly two years ago grew in part from severe shortages of food, especially meat. But meat production, now satisfactory here, is dependent in large measure on supplies of feed grains.

★ Los Angeles Times
Sat., Sept. 23, 1972—Pa.

POLISH BEER DRINKERS GET THEIR DREAM

Exclusive to The Times from Reuters

WARSAW—A dream came true in the central Polish city of Bydgoszcz when frothy lager beer flowed from household water faucets.

Because of a valve fault, the state brewery emptied its beer tanks into the municipal water system.

"Beer drinkers in Bydgoszcz had great fun when, surprisingly enough, good full light beer with froth started pouring from their taps," the official news agency PAP reported.

accept the Polish interim offer, Mr. Woods said. He is a former president of the World Bank.

"The important thing is that the Polish Government has accepted the commitment to repay," he said. "Whether this is in two years or a hundred, is the precise method to be settled."

"The permanent settlement will cover the interest to be paid in the future, meaning after July 1, 1975, and also the details of a sinking fund which will be used to pay off the bonds. Finally, there will have to be an appropriate recognition of the past unpaid interest." The Polish government stopped interest payments in 1937.

Poland had previously worked out a settlement of her prewar debts with Britain and other countries.

LE MONDE — 12 août 1972

Libres opinions

L'APPEL DE PRAGUE

Par MICHEL ROCARD (*)

QUE la tragédie tchécoslovaque devienne l'objet d'un débat strictement interne de la gauche française, se traduisant par la « réprobation » du P.S. et la « désapprobation » du P.C., réduit misérablement les problèmes angoissants posés à tout socialiste par le processus enclenché depuis 1968 en Tchécoslovaquie. Nous ne jouerons pas la prudence. Les uns et les autres peuvent formuler des phrases mesurées constituant des communiqués équilibrés pour faire semblant de répondre à la question posée. Pour notre part, nous pensons que l'appel qui nous vient de Prague est à la fois résolu et optimiste.

Résolus, Sebata à Brno, Huebl à Prague, et tous leurs camarades emprisonnés, montrent à la face du monde à quel point ils le sont. Ce qu'ils nous disent, c'est qu'en aucun cas il ne faut se teindre ou se soumettre quand, au nom du socialisme, on emprisonne et on condamne des camarades dont le seul tort est d'estimer que les problèmes posés par toute société socialiste en construction ne peuvent être résolus par les armes de l'envahisseur, fût-il « socialiste », et les procès préfabriqués où le faux tient lieu de preuve, où la torture remplace ou accompagne l'interrogatoire. Optimistes, les mêmes camarades le sont dans la mesure où le combat qu'ils engagent refuse les règles imposées par ceux qui les poursuivent. Ils démontrent ainsi la vulnérabilité de l'équipe ou pouvoir, sa non-représentativité, son inexistence.

Il n'est en effet pas possible de juger comme positive l'activité d'un parti communiste au pouvoir qui se livre à de pareilles pratiques.

Ce qui devient clair, c'est qu'il ne s'agit pas d'erreurs ou de faux pas étrangers à la pratique d'ensemble des appareils du parti et de l'Etat. Cessons de parler d'excroissance monstrueuse. Ce qui est en cause, c'est l'ensemble des méthodes et des moyens que secrète le stalinisme, forme dévoyée du marxisme, qui bouche toutes les perspectives socialistes au lieu de les ouvrir. C'est très précisément au nom d'une tout autre conception du socialisme que se battent aujourd'hui ceux qui se trouvent dans les geôles de Husak.

Le printemps de Prague, l'expérience de Dubcek, avaient fait naître d'immenses espoirs. Il n'a jamais été question pour nous d'idéaliser la période et d'approuver sans réserve ce qui fut dit et fait à l'époque en Tchécoslovaquie. Il y a bien des nuances à apporter dans le jugement que l'on peut avancer sur l'activité de la direction du parti communiste tchécoslovaque, dont nous n'ignorons pas qu'elle avait elle-même (et telle qu'elle était renouvelée) partagé pendant longtemps les erreurs stalinienne.

Mais une double espérance était née :

— D'une part, il apparaissait qu'au sein même du mouvement communiste des hommes pouvaient infléchir la ligne, changer de structure, au point de remettre en cause non le socialisme mais au contraire tout ce qui en dénaturait le sens, au travers de pratiques bureaucratiques qui avaient (et ont de nouveau) vidé l'essentiel de son contenu le projet socialiste dont nous nous réclamons ;

— D'autre part, la liberté de discussion, de dialogue, le goût du risque, réapparaissent dans des conditions qui, quoi que l'on ait dit, n'avaient rien d'assimilable aux conditions qui nous ont faites dans les pays capitalistes.

Oui, une formidable espérance naissait, dont, dès ce moment, nous avons souligné l'importance.

Quatre ans se sont passés. Lentement d'abord, puis brutalement, les vieilles pratiques ont repris le dessus. L'appareil policier et le nouveau établit ses antennes à tous les niveaux. Ce que les communistes de l'Union soviétique veulent obtenir à toute force, c'est le silence.

Les habiletés des uns et des autres, ici en France, contribuent à l'épaissir.

Nous ne ferons pas de même. Des camarades dont nous partageons l'espérance et la résolution refusent en Tchécoslovaquie de se taire, dans des conditions d'une difficulté inexprimable.

Le temps est venu de mener campagne et d'affirmer notre solidarité en des termes qui n'ont rien à voir avec les préoccupations diplomatiques familières à la classe politique française, gauche y compris.

L'appel qui nous vient de Tchécoslovaquie exige que tous ceux qui se réclament du socialisme en France organisent la solidarité avec leur camarades poursuivis, sous toutes ses formes. Nous nous y emploierons.

(*) Secrétaire national du P.S.U.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 October 1972

Cardinal Krol Invites Wyszynski of Poland to the U.S.

By JAMES FERON
Special to The New York Times

WARSAW, Oct. 12 — John Cardinal Krol of Philadelphia said today that he had invited the Polish primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, to visit the United States and that he hoped that the "improved atmosphere" between church and state in Poland would enable Cardinal Wyszynski to accept.

Cardinal Krol said a Polish prelate would be greeted "joyously" by the millions of Americans of Polish background. He said Cardinal Wyszynski had told him that he was "anxious to come," but had given no firm indication that he could.

The American prelate, whose parents were born here, is the nominal head of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States and the highest-ranking American Catholic to visit Poland. As president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, he holds a position roughly equivalent to the primacy here of Cardinal Wyszynski.

Tells of 1966 Attempt

Cardinal Krol, speaking to some newsmen in the anteroom of the primate's palace in Warsaw's rebuilt Old Town, said that his Polish host had been invited to the United States

several times, most notably in 1966 during the 1,000th anniversary of the Polish church.

Communist authorities here refused to let him go, however. That same year, Cardinal Krol said, a trip to Poland that he had planned was canceled by Polish Government officials only two weeks after he was told that a visa would be forthcoming.

The American archbishop reiterated publicly his invitation tonight at a service in St. John's Cathedral, which drew a capacity attendance of about 3,000. He mentioned earlier invitations to Poland, without elaboration.

Relations Have Eased

Cardinal Wyszynski, who delivered a sermon at the beginning of the mass, welcomed his guest as a "son of the free American soil." The sermon, with repeated references to the "desire for freedom," was interpreted here as an apparent allusion to church-state tensions here since World War II.

Church-state relations are now considerably improved, especially since Edward Gierk replaced Wladyslaw Gomułka as the Communist party leader in 1970 and launched a program aimed at "normalizing" church-state ties.

Cardinal Krol was here as a

young priest just before the outbreak of World War II. He escaped across the southern Tatra Mountains to Budapest as the Nazis marched in from the west. Government officials greeted Cardinal Krol at the airport here yesterday as he began his six-day pilgrimage. Newspapers are reporting on his activities.


The American churchman met this morning with a leading Government and Communist party official, Wincenty Krasko, who is also head of the Polonia society, which seeks to maintain ties with the Polish community abroad. Mr. Krasko, who once held high

party posts and was moved aside in a political shuffle, is still an influential party figure and serves as deputy head of state.

It was considered unusual for a ranking party member to speak with a high American church official, even if they limited their discussion, as Cardinal Krol said they did, to ways of improving Polish-American ties.

Cardinal Krol spent his first day in Warsaw on the city's streets, speaking with young seminarians, saying mass and listening to his Polish colleagues describing the activities of the church here.

LE SOIR, Brussels
7 October 1972



AU mois de septembre dernier, lorsque la Pravda de Moscou annonça « à la une » que les premiers flocons de neige étaient tombés à Kazakhstan, les spécialistes comprirent que l'heure du bilan de « l'été du siècle » était arrivée. Quelques jours plus tard, le Soviet suprême se réunit à Moscou (sans être, pour la première fois, précédé d'une session du comité central du parti), mais ses débats portèrent sur tout, sauf sur le seul problème véritablement urgent, celui de l'agriculture. Tout le monde comprit alors que ce bilan serait particulièrement lourd.

Il est très lourd en effet.

L'Union Soviétique vient d'enregistrer, en 1972, une catastrophe agricole sans précédent depuis la dernière guerre. Si, en 1970, elle a fait une récolte record de 187 millions de céréales — dont presque 100 millions de tonnes de blé —, en 1971, cette récolte n'était plus que de 181 millions de tonnes — dont moins de 99 millions de tonnes de blé — et, en 1972, elle ne dépassera pas 150 millions de tonnes — dont seulement 80 millions de tonnes de blé. La perte est donc énorme, égale, par exemple, à deux récoltes totales de la Pologne. Le plan économique pour cette année se trouve compromis et le plan quinquennal est très sérieusement menacé, non pas seulement au chapitre agricole.

Mais, selon René Dumont, le spécialiste français de l'agriculture russe, ces 150 millions de tonnes devraient largement suffire à nourrir 245 millions de Soviétiques. La Chine a, selon lui, en effet, réussi à nourrir correctement près de 800 mil-

lions d'habitants, avec 246 millions de tonnes « d'aliments de base ».

La situation en U.R.S.S. est cependant différente. Il y a là de grandes pertes de ramassage, des défaillances dans les transports, une très mauvaise utilisation d'un imposant parc de machines. Il y a aussi une bureaucratie rouillée, incapable de réagir efficacement aux alertes. Et d'autre part la population russe est lasse des pénuries, elle demande que les promesses soient respectées et elle refuse de se soumettre à une discipline de modèle chinois.

Le deuxième volet de ce lourd bilan se situe sur un fond plus vaste. En 1913, l'agriculture russe accusait un retard estimé à un siècle par rapport à l'agriculture occidentale. Avec sept quintaux à l'hectare, elle réalisait la moitié seulement du rendement français de l'époque. Aujourd'hui, avec quinze quintaux elle arrive à peine à un tiers de l'actuel rendement occidental. Sur le plan de la productivité par travailleur, c'est encore plus grave : un agriculteur soviétique produit huit fois moins que son collègue américain. Or, en U.R.S.S., depuis de longues années déjà, l'agriculture se trouve au premier plan des préoccupations du pouvoir. Depuis de longues années, le taux de croissance d'investissement est plus élevé dans l'agriculture que dans les autres chapitres de la « Piatiletka » (plan quinquennal).

Et finalement les effets de la chute dans l'agriculture vont

lourdement hypothéquer la balance commerciale de l'U.R.S.S. pour une longue période. Les achats soviétiques de céréales ont battu tous les records cette année, en s'élevant à plus de 25 millions de tonnes de céréales, dont 18 millions de blé, d'une valeur totale de plus de deux milliards de dollars. Le marché international des céréales, qui suffoquait sous le poids des excédents, respire grâce aux Soviétiques. Même la pression américaine sur les pays du Marché commun est devenue plus supportable : leurs stocks s'accroissent. Les 750 millions de dollars de crédits accordés aux Soviétiques par les États-Unis, pour une période de trois ans, ont été épuisés en deux mois de temps. L'offre d'achat soviétique est de 50 % plus importante que celle de l'Inde, lors de la grande famine de la fin des années 1960. Il est bien évident qu'un tel taux d'achats agricoles est à la longue intenable, à moins qu'il ne corresponde à une réduction drastique des importations industrielles. Or, il ne faut pas longtemps épiloguer sur les conséquences d'une telle réduction pour l'ensemble de l'économie soviétique.

Un seul homme en U.R.S.S. est responsable de l'agriculture. M. Brejnev a personnellement assumé cette responsabilité lors de la reprise, en 1964, de l'héritage de M. Khrouchtchev. M. Brejnev est conscient de cette responsabilité et il ne s'y dérobe pas. Il prépare la bataille.

Il a d'abord ajourné le plenum du comité central, en repoussant ainsi l'heure de la vérité. Il a personnellement dirigé l'action de sauvetage de la récolte en interrompant par deux fois ses vacances et en restant un temps inhabituellement long

dans la campagne, sur le front de la grande bataille. Il a reporté également son voyage, prévu depuis fort longtemps, en Hongrie, pour pouvoir se consacrer à la préparation de ce plenum décisif. Il a pris la décision d'acheter en masse le blé étranger, pour éviter le pire, c'est-à-dire le rationnement du pain.

Et finalement, il a sonné le rassemblement de ses alliés. D'une part il a décidé que ce prochain plenum serait élargi aux représentants de l'appareil du parti non membres du Comité central, lesquels soutiennent, en majorité, le Premier secrétaire.

D'autre part, il a adressé un appel « à l'étranger » et tout d'abord aux États-Unis. M. Matskievitch, ministre de l'Agriculture a accordé à une agence américaine une interview qui — fait sans précédent — n'a pas été publiée en U.R.S.S. Le fait que MM. Peterson et Butz, respectivement ministres du Commerce et de l'Agriculture des États-Unis aient assisté aux conversations entre MM. Nixon et Gromyko suggère que cet appel a été compris.

En octobre 1964, Nikita Khrouchtchev réclamait une augmentation de dotation à l'agriculture, certaines limitations pour l'industrie et un accroissement des importations de blé. Quinze jours plus tard il était limogé.

M. Brejnev connaît mieux que quiconque les véritables causes du déclin de son prédécesseur. Et il sait que sa politique agricole y était pour quelque chose.

Tout indique qu'à présent M. Brejnev se retrouve devant le même problème...

Fol MATHIL.

M. Brejnev à l'heure de la vérité

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 October 1972

Soviet propaganda shifts emphasis

By Leo Grullov
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

Slogans issued for the Nov. 7 anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution suggest that, in view of the poor harvest, internal propaganda will lay less stress on the goal of rapid improvement of living standards and more on the effort to spur production.

May Day and Nov. 7 are the country's two major holidays. About a fortnight in advance of each of these, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party issues a series of about 60 slogans setting guidelines for propaganda. The slogans then appear on banners, provide the texts for posters, and furnish the

keynotes for public speeches and newspaper articles.

Usually the slogans repeat the old ones with minor variations. Each change from the previous set of slogans indicates current policy.

Whereas 1971 November slogans and 1972 May Day slogans had viewed the labor of the people as a "guarantee" of "the chief task of the five-year plan — a substantial rise in public well-being," the new slogans do not mention this rise as the chief goal but simply call for "a stubborn fight" to improve the economy, "the basis of the motherland's might and of steady growth in public well-being."

Western Europe

WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1972

East, West Germany Implement First Treaty

By John M. Goshko

Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Oct. 17 — East and West Germany today put into effect their first formal treaty in the quarter century since this country's division into Communist and democratic states.

The treaty is aimed at easing restrictions on traffic across the 840-mile border separating the two Germans. It is expected to mean substantial practical improvements for the movement of both people and goods between East and West.

Even more important: It is regarded as an important step toward concluding a more sweeping "basic treaty" that would establish a new relationship between the two states. This would open the door to

widespread Western recognition for East Germany and result in both states being jointly admitted to the United Nations.

Negotiations on the basic treaty have been intensified in hopes of concluding the agreement before the West German national elections on Nov. 19. The two sides are still far from agreement on how to define this new relationship.

This was underscored at today's brief ceremony putting the traffic treaty into effect. East German State Secretary Michael Kohl said there was no doubt that the treaty had the effect of establishing formal relations between the two governments under international law.

However, his negotiating opposite number, West German State Secretary Egon Bahr, in-

terjected that Bonn cannot accord full diplomatic recognition to East Germany because such a step would contravene the rights held by the four World War II victors.

Bahr and other West German officials also pointed out that although the traffic treaty has a fully binding character under international law, the ceremony did not include an exchange of formal instruments of ratification. Instead, the two governments passed each other notes stating their intention to activate the treaty immediately.

The accord's principal points stipulate that:

- West Germans will be

able to visit East Germany for up to 30 days a year, with the travel broken into segments rather than having to be used all at one time.

- West Germans will be able to visit all parts of East Germany rather than being limited to areas where they have relatives or business.

- Restrictions on the use of automobiles for travel within East Germany will be eased greatly.

The practical benefits of the traffic treaty apply principally to persons from West Germany. On the other side, the Communist government in East Berlin will continue to impose on its citizens the tight travel restrictions in effect ever since the border was sealed in 1961.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 October 1972

ACCORD RATIFIED BY 2 GERMANYS

Pact Easing Transit Rules
in Effect at Midnight

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

BONN, Oct. 17—West Germany and East German today exchange notes of ratification of a traffic treaty designed to increase greatly the movement of people between the hitherto hostile states.

The treaty, to go into effect at midnight tonight, relaxes the rules of transport across the divided country by water, rail and road. But when the negotiations were completed last May, the East German Government also issued an appendix declaring its willingness to facilitate the movement of Germans between the two states.

This for the first time permits large numbers of East Germans to visit West Germany, but under East German regulations, they must submit evidence of "urgency." Grandparents, parents, children and brothers and sisters are to be allowed to visit relatives in West Germany in the case of

family marriages, births, serious illness or deaths.

West German authorities estimate that there would be as many as 100,000 such "emergency" visits from East Germany each year.

A further easing of East German visits to West Germany is seen in the permission for pensioners—women over 60 and men over 65—to make more than one visit a year.

Can Make Series of Trips

The new arrangements allow an increase in the number of visits across the frontier by West Germans. They permit West Germans to visit East German friends and relatives for 30 days a year in one or a series of trips. In addition, they may go to East Germany for commercial, religious, touristic, cultural or sports events beyond the one-month limit.

So far this year, 2.6 million West Germans have visited East Germany, according to Government statistics. However, some 3.5 million East Germans once lived in East Germany. They left, most of them illegally, between 1949 and 1961, when the Berlin Wall was constructed. Yesterday, the East German Government announced that all criminal charges against those who fled were being dropped, which could lead to a further increase in visits by former East Germans to the East.

The new arrangements also ease some of the restrictions that had previously been im-

posed on West Germans within East Germany.

Businessmen traveling to such events as the Leipzig Trade Fair, for example, will be allowed to take their young children along. In addition, West Germans will be allowed to tour East Germany instead of being restricted to one district.

Differ on Meaning

BONN, Oct. 17 (UPI)—The West and East German state secretaries who exchanged the notes of ratification here today differed at once on whether the ceremony meant West Germany had recognized East Germany as a sovereign state.

"Whoever claims that this treaty does not amount to full relations under international law is fooling himself," Michael Kohl of East Germany told reporters at the ceremony.

But Egon Bahr of West Germany said, "We are not yet breaking new ground." He restated Chancellor Willy Brandt's position that West Germany could not recognize East Germany as sovereign so long as the wartime occupation powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France—maintained rights covering all of Germany.

Mr. Bahr said West Germany now negotiates treaties with East Germany because it desires to improve relations and "there is no alternative way of doing things."

NEW YORK TIMES
15 October 1972

ITALIAN'S DEATH STILL MYSTERY

Charges Dropped in Case of
Wealthy Leftist Publisher

Special to The New York Times

MILAN, Oct. 8—Investigators here know a great deal now about the adventurous life of Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, the publisher who introduced Pasternak's "Doctor Zhivago" to the West, but they still don't know how he died.

The body of the 45-year-old leftist publisher, a multimillionaire, was found at the base of a sabotaged power pylon on the outskirts of this city on March 15.

The discovery caused a sensation throughout Italy. It followed a chain of terroristic bombings, and may have influenced the parliamentary elections in May, which showed a slight swing to the right.

During the last few days, the investigating magistrate in charge of the judicial probe into Mr. Feltrinelli's death dropped charges against several persons who had been suspected of having participated with him in a subversive conspiracy, and granted bail to

others who had until now been held. The magistrate's decisions are interpreted as an implicit admission that the inquiry has led into a blind alley.

'A Crass Amateur'

"We know that Feltrinelli had been in contact with ultra-leftist networks during the last years of his life and that he bankrolled them," an official said privately. "We are pretty sure that he was killed while he was trying to blow up the pylon of the high-tension power line in a way a crass amateur would handle explosives. But we assume that somebody was with Feltrinelli, maybe two persons, and we still can't identify them by evidence that would stand up in court."

Former associates of Mr. Feltrinelli and left-wing groups here say they are convinced that the publisher was lured into a trap in a right-wing plot.

While the judicial inquiry seems stalled, the Feltrinelli publishing house has commissioned a biography of its elusive founder. The company is continuing its activity with Mr.

Feltrinelli's third wife, Inge Schoental Feltrinelli, as its new president.

She is just back from her native Germany where she helped represent the Feltrinelli publishing house at the Frankfurt Book Fair. The third Mrs. Feltrinelli, and the publisher's fourth wife, Stella Melega Feltrinelli, have been repeatedly questioned by investigators during the last seven months.

Mr. Feltrinelli's will designated his only son—by his third wife—as sole heir. His son, Fitzgerald Feltrinelli, the publisher's son, is 10 years old and goes to school here.

Timber and Banking Fortune

The Feltrinelli fortune is built on a timber and banking empire left by the publisher's father, Carlo Feltrinelli, and today includes real estate in Italy and Austria, and sizable interests in many Italian business enterprises.

The Feltrinelli publishing venture scored two resounding successes that brought international fame and large royalties. They were the publication in 1957 of "Doctor Zhi-

vago" and in 1958 of the posthumous novel "The Leopard" by Giuseppe Tommasi di Lampedusa, a Sicilian writer who had been in obscurity during his life.

Soviet displeasure over the appearance of the Pasternak book—which won its author the 1952 Nobel Prize for literature—caused Mr. Feltrinelli to break with the Italian Communist party. The publisher had been a party member since the end of World War II, and after the Pasternak controversy drifted into far-left radicalism.

After being investigated for a suspected role in some bombings on the Italian mainland in 1969, Mr. Feltrinelli disappeared from his country at the end of that year, but apparently slipped back on various occasions. There were forged identity documents on him when his body was found.

Pasternak Funds Used?

Italian newspapers suggested during the last few months that Mr. Feltrinelli may have used funds belonging to Pasternak and his heirs to finance terroristic activities.

Mr. Feltrinelli always refused to disclose his financial agreements with Pasternak, and the amount of royalties that "Doctor Zhivago" had earned.

However, it was reliably understood that the total royalties exceeded \$2-million, and that in agreement with Pasternak a large part of the 50 percent Pasternak share was being kept in trust by Mr. Feltrinelli, presumably in Swiss banks.

Asked about the royalties, a spokesman for the Feltrinelli publishing house, Alba Marino, said: "Relations with Pasternak were regularized, and royalties are being paid as they mature."

Requested to name the persons to whom the royalties were being paid, the spokesman said that the funds were "presumably" going to the author's heirs.

"The matter has been resolved," the Feltrinelli official remarked. "These are old, anguishing matters. Why rehash them?"

NEW YORK TIMES 18 October 1972 Official of Al Fatah Shot Dead in Rome

Special to The New York Times

ROME, Oct. 17—A Libyan Embassy employee, a Jordanian who is believed to have been a member of Al Fatah, the Palestinian guerrilla organization, was shot dead last night outside his suburban apartment.

The 38-year-old victim, Abdel Weil Zuaiter of Nablus, Jordan, was described today by Fatah's press agency in Beirut as its representative for Italy. It said he was a martyr and hero of the Palestinian cause, "assassinated" by Israeli secret-service operatives.

A Jordanian Embassy official said Mr. Zuaiter was a nephew of Akram Zuaiter, Jordan's Ambassador in Beirut but declined to confirm report that he was also a second cousin of Yasir Arafat, leader of Fatah.

The police said the murder had been carefully planned. Neighbors told the police they saw two men fire and then escape in a waiting car.

The car was found a few blocks from the scene. The police said it was rented Sun-

day by a man who showed a Canadian driver's license. On which he was named as Anthony Hutton, 47, of Toronto.

The police disclosed that Mr. Zuaiter, who officially was a translator for the Libyan Embassy, had been ideologically involved in activities on behalf of Palestinian refugees and Guerrillas. Two of his brothers were killed four years ago during an Israeli incursion into Lebanon, it was said.

According to the police, Mr. Zuaiter had been a contributor to Palestine, a pro-Palestinian periodical issued here until a year ago and organized and led meetings of Italian leftist pro-Arab and rightist anti-Jewish movements. Recently, he collected funds to build a hospital in a Palestinian guerrilla camp.

In September, 1970, he was reported in Amman and was a frequent traveler to Libya.

Mr. Zuaiter was questioned in connection with the attempt by two Jordanians to blow up an Israeli airliner on Aug. 17, the police said.

A statement by the Ambassadors to Italy and the Vatican of the 18 member countries of the Arab League said that the "Horrible Crime recalls the actions of the Zionist bands that have written notorious pages in the history of terrorism and violence, in Palestine and elsewhere."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 17 October 1972

France reports check on drug trafficking

By Reuter

Paris

French antidrug squads have seized a total of 4½ tons of drugs, including a ton of heroin, in the last three years, it is reported here.

French Interior Minister Raymond Marcellin said 200 officers now work full time chasing drug traffickers, compared with only 40 in 1969. This has resulted in 775 arrests over the last three years.

Mr. Marcellin said illegal drug exporting networks from France to the United States had been combatted, thanks to cooperation with the American narcotics bureau.

So far this year, he said, 67 international drug traffickers had been arrested in France and about 20 in the United States, Canada, Italy, and West Germany, thanks to efforts by the French antidrug services.

Die Welt
Hamburg, 11 October 1972

Activity of German Ivanovich Vladimirov Known in the West
for 20 Years

Soviet Consul General in Hamburg is a KGB Agent

The first Soviet Consul General in Hamburg, German Ivanovich Vladimirov, is a high ranking KGB officer with great intelligence experience abroad. This was confirmed by reliable sources in Washington who are concerned with the activity of the Soviet intelligence service around the world. The case has been a matter of a CDU inquiry in the Bundestag.

Vladimirov who currently is an Embassy Counselor of the Soviet Union in Bonn most likely will concern himself in behalf of the KGB with matters relating to northern Germany and the entire northern sector of NATO once the Consulate General in Hamburg officially opens.

American experts have known Vladimirov for about 20 years. For instance, he had been identified in Vienna as early as 1953 as a member of the Soviet intelligence service (KGB). When he left Vienna in 1958 another well-known KGB officer replaced him there, namely Victor Roshnov.

Expelled Because of Espionage Activities

Sergej Kudrjavzev, who had been expelled by the Canadian Government because of espionage activities in 1945 and Vladimir Zyganov, who had been asked to leave the Federal Republic by the federal government in 1968 were close co-workers of Vladimirov's at the Bonn Embassy. Vladimirov was formerly in the Press Section and today he is in the Cultural Section of the Soviet Embassy at the Bonn Embassy.

The American experts are a little bit surprised that as experienced a KGB officer as Vladimirov will now become the chief at the Consulate General. Earlier experiences indicate that Moscow prefers to place KGB people in second or third positions and not to make them chiefs of mission.

It is believed that Vladimirov will enlarge the espionage net of the Soviets in northern Germany from the Hamburg base. The development of a comprehensive net of agents and saboteurs has been the objective for a long time of the Soviet KGB.

In the event of military conflict the KGB agents would be tasked with rendering German ports unuseable through acts of sabotage and thus to facilitate the advance of the Red Army.

Vladimirov's interests are, however, not confined to the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1969 he appeared for instance, under diplomatic cover presumably concerned with cultural affairs' matters, in the Norwegian capital of Oslo. Vladimirov used the occasion of the opening of an air route of Aeroflot from Moscow to Oslo for conducting a conference in which the KGB officers Lepeshkin and Grushko participated; they are responsible for Norwegian affairs.

DIE WELT, Hamburg
11 October 1972

Tätigkeit von German Iwanowitsch Wladimirow schon seit 20 Jahren im Westen bekannt

Sowjetischer Generalkonsul in Hamburg ein KGB-Agent

Washington, 10. Oktober (SAD)

Der erste sowjetische Generalkonsul in Hamburg, German Iwanowitsch Wladimirow, ist ein höherer KGB-Offizier mit langer Auslandserfahrung im Geheimdienstfach. Das bestätigten jetzt zuverlässige Kreise in Washington, die sich mit der Tätigkeit des sowjetischen Geheimdienstes in aller Welt befassen. Der Fall war schon Gegenstand einer CDU-Anfrage im Bundestag.

Wladimirow, der zur Zeit als Botschaftsrat seines Landes in Bonn tätig ist, wird wahrscheinlich nach der offiziellen Eröffnung des Generalkonsulats von Hamburg aus den norddeutschen Raum und den gesamten nördlichen NATO-Bereich für den KGB bearbeiten.

Amerikanischen Experten ist Wladimirow seit rund zwanzig Jahren bekannt. In Wien wurde er zum Beispiel schon 1953 als Mitglied des sowjetischen Geheimdienstes identifiziert. Als er 1958 Wien verließ, löste ihn ein anderer bekannter KGB-Offizier dort ab: Viktor Roschnow.

Wegen Spionage ausgewiesen

Enge Mitarbeiter Wladimirows an der Bonner Botschaft waren Sergej Kudrjawzew, den die kanadische Regierung 1945 wegen Spionage ausgewiesen hatte, und Wladimir Zyganow, der 1968 von der Bundesregierung zum Verlassen des Landes aufgefordert worden war. Wladimirow war früher in der Presseabteilung und ist heute in der Kulturabteilung der sowjetischen Botschaft am Rolandseck tätig.

Daß ein erfahrener Geheimdienstler wie Wladimirow jetzt zum Chef eines Generalkonsulats gemacht wird, hat die amerikanischen Experten ein wenig verwundert. Nach früheren Erfahrungen zieht es Moskau vor, die KGB-Leute im zweiten oder dritten Glied zu halten und sie nicht zu Missionschefs zu machen.

Es wird vermutet, daß Wladimirow von Hamburg aus das Spionagenetz der Sowjets in Norddeutschland weiterentwickeln wird. Die Entwicklung eines ausgedehnten Netzes von Agenten und Saboteuren gehört seit langem zu den Zielen des sowjetischen Geheimdienstes.

Im Falle kriegerischer Auseinandersetzungen fiele den Agenten des KGB die Aufgabe zu, die deutschen Häfen durch Sabotageakte unbenutzbar zu machen und so der Roten Armee einen Vormarsch zu erleichtern.

Wladimirows Interesse beschränkt sich jedoch nicht auf die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Im Jahre 1969 tauchte er zum Beispiel, mit dem Deckmantel eines mit Kulturfragen befaßten Diplomaten versehen, in der norwegischen Hauptstadt Oslo auf. Wladimirow benutzte den Eröffnungsflug der Aeroflot von Moskau nach Oslo zur Abhaltung einer Konferenz, an der sich die für Norwegen zuständigen Geheimdienstoffiziere Lepeschkin und Gruschko beteiligten.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 October 1972

EEC nations weigh

tough anti-drug stance

By Reuter

Rome

Britain and the six Common Market countries have agreed in principle that a new, tough, and concerted European line is needed to combat the drug traffic.

A statement issued after a recent two-day conference in Rome said they recognized that the development of the Common Market could hinder the war against drug smugglers because relaxations of restrictions on the movement of persons and goods between the participating states could be abused.

But among the measures the ministers thought should be studied were restrictions on the freedom of international movement of those convicted of international trafficking, improved extradition agreements, and prohibition of propaganda encouraging drug abuse.

WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1972

• A Soviet scientist whom Italian police described as a missile expert from Lithuania slipped away from a Soviet tourist group in Genoa.

Other proposals listed in the statement were to use Interpol, the International Police Organization, to coordinate the efforts of national police and customs authorities to combat drug trafficking.

They also suggested having permanent correspondents based at Interpol to speed up the international flow of information and to set up a central records service.

Near East

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 October 1972

Arab guerrilla factions clash as leadership split deepens

By John K. Cooley

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Beirut, Lebanon

Recent clashes in Lebanon between Palestinian guerrilla factions reflect a deep crisis at the heart of the guerrilla movement.

Radicals who favor spectacular terrorist operations like those the Black September group carried out at the Munich Olympics and who want to resume attacks on Israel's borders are contesting the "moderate" leadership of Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

More fundamentally, the radicals, including much of the guerrilla leadership in Syria and Lebanon, oppose Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's suggestion last month that the Palestinians concentrate on the political target of forming a provisional government in exile.

Mr. Arafat and several other older-generation leaders of the PLO and Al-Fatah, the largest guerrilla organization, see many arguments in favor of the Palestinians thus becoming a recognized political movement.

Israeli planes seized upon the period of strife in the guerrilla movement to attack areas used by the guerrillas in Syria and Lebanon. The Lebanese Army reported 2 civilians killed and 16 injured in raids on three areas of Lebanon.

Observers here felt that the Israeli raids would tend to reinforce the authority of Yasser Arafat by demonstrating that the projects of the more radical guerrilla elements, such as the frogman and motorboat bases, were highly vulnerable to Israeli attack.

The radicals, led in Lebanon by a Maj. Hamdane Aehour who has defied Mr. Arafat's orders transferring him to the relatively remote post of Baghdad, oppose this.

The immediate issue triggering a fight in Lebanon between two Al-Fatah units Oct. 14 was the future of guerrilla seaborne operations against Israel.

Since the last Israeli incursion in mid-September into south Lebanon areas used by the guerrillas, the Lebanese Army has been quietly increasing its curbs on their operations.

Last week it ordered a guerrilla commander named Abu Youssef al Kayed to

remove an installation from an area called Bakbuk, near the southern Lebanese port of Tyre. This was a base for small motorboats used to carry arms and men into Israel and the Gaza Strip by sea.

Guerrillas forced to move

A similar base for guerrilla frogmen at Sarafand, between Tyre and Saida, was attacked by Israeli seaborne commandos in early 1971, disrupting an American University of Pennsylvania Museum archaeological team excavating Phoenician remains there and causing the guerrillas to move the base later on to Bakbuk. The guerrilla group headed by Abu Youssef al-Kayed had begun to rebuild the Sarafand base and was ordered to stop by the Lebanese Army last week.

Mr. Arafat ordered Mr. al-Kayed to obey the Lebanese Army orders by Mr. al-Kayed refused. Mr. al-Kayed was backed by another radical faction supported by Libya, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (general command). This group includes Libyan volunteers and has several times disobeyed orders from the PLO central command.

Fighting between a loyal Al-Fatah unit sent to "discipline" Mr. al-Kayed cost at least three lives and nine wounded, including two Lebanese, in the hills of western Lebanon's Bekaa region close to the Syrian border.

Leader facing trial

Lebanese Army units stayed out of the fight and the loyalists won. Mr. al-Kayed is to be tried by a Palestinian military court, guerrilla sources said.

Palestinians and their supporters here are disheartened by the interneine fighting. Many believe the guerrilla movement will not long survive in the forms in which it has existed since King Hussein's Jordan Army drove the guerrillas out of Jordan in 1970 and 1971.

"The days of uniformed guerrillas and big public promotions are long over," said one influential Palestinian here. "From now on we must wage a clandestine war, as the Israelis did before they won in Palestine in 1948.

At the same time, we must build some kind of political movement representing a Palestinian political consensus. This is an even harder job than waging a terrorist war."

WASHINGTON STAR
17 October 1972

Al Fatah, Dissidents Near Brink

By FAROUK NASSAR

Associated Press

BEIRUT (AP)—Palestinian guerrilla leader Yasser Arafat is moving toward a showdown with a dissident commando group that wants to continue raids into Israel from Lebanon despite an agreement with the army to halt them.

The leader of the dissidents, identified only by his code name of Abu Youssef el Kayed, has been quoted as vowing "to fight until death" if attacked either by Arafat or the Lebanese army.

The two sides clashed briefly in Lebanon's western Bekka Valley, 40 miles south-east of Beirut, on Saturday and two of Arafat's guerrillas were killed.

Al Anway, a Beirut newspaper that has strong connections with Al Fatah, said yesterday that Arafat was bringing reinforcements into the Bekka Valley area for an attack on Kayed and his followers.

It implied the reinforcements were brought from neighboring Syria and said Arafat was planning an "imminent operation to quell the mutiny" from headquarters in the small town of Yanta near the Syrian border.

The Central Committee of Al Fatah, of which Arafat is chairman, has already announced the dismissal of Kayed, who is 30, and pledged to bring him before a "revolutionary court" for disciplinary action.

WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1972

Yemen Attacks

BEIRUT—North Yemeni troops have resumed attacks against Southern Yemen and a large-scale offensive is expected despite the cease-fire agreement arranged by an Arab League peace mission, the embassy of Southern Yemen said.

JOURNAL DE GENEVE
30 September-1 October 1972

Livraisons d'armes à la Syrie

Moscou reconnaît le pont aérien Odessa-Damas

Moscou, 29. — (Reuter) L'Union soviétique fournit des armes modernes à la Syrie et aide à l'entraînement de ses cadres militaires, écrit vendredi la « Pravda ». La « Pravda » ne donne aucun détail sur l'aide militaire soviétique, précisant seulement que, grâce à l'aide soviétique, le port syrien de Latakiah est en cours d'agrandissement.

Le quotidien du Kremlin termine son article en soulignant le rôle des « Etats arabes progressistes qui poursuivent leur révolution nationale démocratique et anti-impérialiste ». Ce commentaire survient au moment où les journaux de Beyrouth suggèrent que Moscou tente de faire de la Syrie et de l'Irak un nouveau front militant qui serait le rival de l'Egypte à la tête du monde arabe.

La « Pravda » rend hommage aux dirigeants du parti baas à Damas et à Bagdad et rappelle la récente visite à Moscou du président irakien Ahmed Hassan Bakr. Lors de cette visite, le Kremlin s'était engagé à aider militairement le mouvement de guérilla palestinienne.

L'intérêt des dirigeants soviétiques pour le mouvement palestinien s'est accru depuis quelques mois.

La suggestion de Sadate mettrait l'URSS dans l'embarras

Moscou, 29. — (AFP) L'agence Tass a diffusé vendredi après-midi, avec près de vingt-quatre heures de retard, des extraits du discours prononcé jeudi par le président Sadate, sans mentionner sa proposition concernant la création d'un gouvernement palestinien.

L'absence de référence à cette suggestion est interprétée par les observateurs à Moscou comme un signe de désapprobation du gouvernement soviétique. La proposition du chef de l'Etat égyptien, estiment les observateurs, va beaucoup plus loin que la position soviétique, exposée il y a un mois dans la « Pravda », favorable à l'unification des organisations de résistance palestiniennes et à la création d'un Front national palestinien. Elle risquerait, si elle était suivie d'effet, de mettre l'URSS dans l'obligation de se prononcer pour ou contre la reconnaissance de ce gouvernement.

WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1972

Bangladesh Admitted as U.N. Observer

UNITED NATIONS—
Bangladesh assumed observer status yesterday at the United Nations. Its application for membership was vetoed by China in August. Other observer delegations include West Germany, South Vietnam, South Korea, Switzerland and the Vatican.

Un arsenal « offensif »

Beyrouth, 29. — (AFP) Les armements soviétiques livrés à la Syrie grâce au pont aérien Odessa-Damas comprennent des armes offensives : des fusées sol-sol, ainsi que des missiles sol-air et des canons anti-aériens, indique vendredi « L'Orient - Le jour », citant des milieux diplomatiques arabes.

Selon ces milieux, « les experts soviétiques et les militaires syriens étudient la possibilité d'installer deux réseaux de radar dans la région située au nord du Golan ».

Quant à l'accord militaire en cours de négociation entre l'URSS et la Syrie, des difficultés auraient surgi sur la durée de cet accord. M. Noureddine Mohieddinov, ambassadeur soviétique à Damas, jouerait un rôle important dans ces pourparlers, ajoute « L'Orient - Le jour ».

WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1972

Sidki Concludes Talks With Soviet Leaders

Reuter

MOSCOW, Oct. 17—Egyptian Premier Aziz Sidki and Soviet leaders today concluded an exchange of views on bilateral relations and the Middle East situation, Tass news agency said.

It was the first high-level meeting between the two countries since President Anwar Sadat expelled most of the 20,000 Soviet military personnel from Egypt three months ago.

The brevity of the latest talks led to some speculation that Sidki may have made a fruitless appeal for offensive weapons. But Egyptian sources in Moscow described today's talks as fruitful and said they had lasted four hours.

Tass gave no immediate details but said that the two sides had "reached agreement concerning the publication of a joint Soviet-Egyptian communique on the results of the talks."

WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1972

Oil Talks Set

KUWAIT — Five oil-producing Persian gulf states—Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Iraq, Qatar and Kuwait—have decided to open a new round of talks with Western oil companies operating in their territory on state participation in their concessions.

WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1972

A martial law court in Ankara, Turkey, sentenced 13 leaders of the banned Turkish Labor Party, including the party chairman Mrs. Behice Boran, to 15 years in prison. Mrs. Boran, who studied at the University of Michigan, was the first woman to head a Turkish political party.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 October 1972

Greek Foreign Post Is Filled

Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, Oct. 12—Phaedon Anninos Kavalieratos, a 60-year-old career diplomat, was sworn in today as Deputy Foreign Minister, a post that gives him virtual control of Greek foreign affairs.



Wednesday, Oct. 18, 1972 THE WASHINGTON POST

Nationalists Want Recognition of U.N. Authority in Namibia

By Peter Younghusband
Special to The Washington Post

CAPE TOWN, Oct. 17—The militant Southwest Africa People's Organization has told United Nations envoy Alfred Escher that it wants to obtain from the South African government a formal recognition of the world body's authority over Namibia (Southwest Africa).

The group also told Escher, the U.N. special representative for Namibia, that it sought an assurance of South Africa's total and immediate withdrawal from the territory and asked him to obtain it. South Africa has refused such conditions in the past.

Exiled leaders of the organization presented Escher with

these demands while he was in Geneva recently on his way here for a South African government-conducted tour of Namibia. His visit is just now winding up. No newsmen were allowed to accompany the U.N. envoy.

Details of the Geneva meeting were released today in Windhoek, capital of Namibia, by representatives of the nationalist organization.

Escher, a retired Swiss diplomat, is scheduled to report back to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim prior to next month's debate over the status of Namibia.

South African Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller said yesterday in a radio interview

here that the outcome of current negotiations with the United Nations would largely determine his country's future relations with the world body.

Namibia, formerly a German colony, became a trust territory under South African administration after World War I under a mandate from the League of Nations.

The United Nations has never recognized South Africa's jurisdiction over the territory and the International Court ruled in 1971 that its presence in Namibia was illegal.

The reason for Escher's visit, which follows one by Wald-

heim earlier this year, is to determine whether Namibia's 700,000 inhabitants are willing to go along with a South African blueprint for the territory.

South Africa has a plan to subdivide Namibia into six or more mini-states with a different ethnic group living in each one. Eventually, they would become independent states.

Namibia's 70,000 white inhabitants favor the South African plan. But African nationalists claiming to represent the majority view are demanding that Namibia remain a centrally governed, single state, a position the United Nations has also adopted.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 October 1972

Morocco Puts 220 on Trial for Attempt on King Hassan's Life

Special to The New York Times

KENITRA, Morocco, Oct. 17 — A military tribunal was told here today that rebel Moroccan Air Force pilots pumped salvos of cannon fire into an airliner carrying King Hassan II, dropped their fuel tanks on it and bumped it with one of their warplanes last August.

The statement was made as the court-martial of 220 air force officers and men implicated in the abortive coup began today. They are charged with premeditated attempts on the lives of King Hassan and the royal family, attempted overthrow of the regime and other crimes. The leaders face the death penalty.

According to the indictment read in the heavily guarded courtroom, a plot was developed by Gen. Mohammed Oufkir, the late Defense Minister and army chief of staff, shortly after another group of army rebels tried to overthrow the King in a raid on the royal palace at Skhirat in July, 1971.

General Oufkir, long considered the staunchest and most powerful supporter of the regime, was found shot dead eight hours after the coup failed, and officials said he had committed suicide when he learned the King knew of his betrayal.

The indictment said that on

Aug. 16, six jet fighters took off from Kenitra air base to meet the royal airliner, which was bringing King Hassan home after a three-week visit to France.

It said that led Maj. Kouera el-Wafi, commander of the base, the three jets had fired at close range, riddling the airliner, until they had run out of ammunition.

When this failed to bring the plane down, the indictment said, Major Kouera and another pilot jettisoned their auxiliary fuel tanks over it, without success. Then the major struck the airliner's tail assembly with his wing tip in a last attempt to force it down.

The bumping apparently damaged Major Kouera's plane and he was forced to bail out, and was captured shortly afterward.

The rebels' jets strafed the airport at Rabat and attacked the royal palace in the capital.

King Hassan escaped unhurt, although at the airport at least eight persons were killed and 47 wounded, including four Cabinet ministers waiting to greet the King, whose plane landed with one of three engines functioning.

JAPAN TIMES
5 October 1972

Gaddafi Criticizes Arabs for Inaction

CAIRO (Kyodo-Reuters) — The Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Gaddafi, said Saturday the Arab world had lost its sense of direction and the future of the battle against Israel was not known.

Addressing a mass rally in Tripoli, broadcast live and monitored here, Col. Gaddafi said the present situation in the Arab world could best be described as "vague and shrouded in mist."

The Libyan leader, who is an advocate of military action against Israel, criticized the Arab world for its inaction and its failure to adopt a unanimous attitude toward Israel.

"There is no unanimity on a pan-Arab battle, there is no unanimity on support for Palestini-

an guerrillas and no unanimity on waging a regular war against Israel."

He said the only forces existing in the Arab world were Egypt and Syria.

As a result of this situation the Arab world had lost its "sense of direction and the future of the battle against Israel is unknown," he said.

"Everyone in the Arab world is lost and does not know where the solution lies."

For Libya itself, the situation was clear: Palestinian guerrilla action must start from all fronts and there was no justification for restricting commando action, Col. Gaddafi said.

Recalling Israeli attacks against the south of Lebanon

last month, the Libyan leader said the stand of the Arab countries at that time was "most shameful."

"The Arab world needs a revolution because it has lost its sense of direction," he said, to loud applause.

In a passing reference to Arab-Soviet relations, the Libyan leader said "friendship with the Soviet Union must be friend-

ship between equals."

Col. Gaddafi, who has always been a strong supporter of Palestinian guerrilla fighters and is training them in his own country, criticized Palestinian leaders for indulging in ideological disputes.

"Instead of fighting to regain their own land, they are now fighting over ideologies," he said.

The Palestinians must bear the responsibility of fighting to liberate their land, he said. He bitterly criticized them for being divided in groups and parties.

Pointing out that Libya was paying generous contribution to Palestinian guerrillas, Col. Gaddafi urged Palestinian resistance fighters to live up to the role expected of them.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1972

Common Market Curb on Produce Angers 18 African Countries

By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Oct. 17—A dispute that involves some of the fundamental issues of economic relations between developed and developing countries has arisen between the European Economic Community and its 18 associated territories, mostly former French colonies, in Africa.

The conflict concerns the fruits and vegetables—peas, beans, sweet pimentos, sweet peppers, eggplant, gourds, celery and melons—that the Africans want to sell more of to Europe.

Italy, the poorest country in the Community, or Common Market, produces similar products and wants to export more to her European neighbors.

Normally, such problems are resolved amicably and quietly under the 10-year-old special arrangements the Europeans have with the African countries, which give the Africans privileges not accorded to other developing countries.

This time openly expressed bitterness and discord caused an almost complete breakdown in the machinery of settlement. Both sides have finally agreed to accept the good offices of a mediator, Jean Rey, a Belgian who is a former president of the Common Market's executive authority and who will report before the end of the year.

The whole thing is embarrassing for the Common Market, coming just a few days before the leaders of six present and three future members

meet here to try to work out, among other things, policies toward poorer countries. The dispute shows that when domestic interests are directly involved, it is different to be generous.

Formerly the Africans benefited from total tariff exemption for their fruits and vegetables shipped to the Common Market. In fact, funds have been channeled into Africa to help develop the fruit and vegetable industry.

Last year, because of pressure from Italy, the Common Market imposed an import calendar, which meant that the Africans could ship their products duty-free only at specified times.

At a Common Market Council meeting in Luxembourg last week, African ministers told the members exactly what they thought of the new protectionism. There were two main points:

"The Common Market has no right to take away something already given.

"The African states are now worse off than some nonmembers such as Greece that have association agreements. The Africans found it intolerable that the bloc, in effect, should have made access easier for the Government of the Athens colonels.

Common Market spokesmen said that the import calendar was to be re-examined next May and that the complaints would then be taken into account.

There was another element

that caused temperatures to rise. The debate was running into the early morning hours and many of the European ministers and officials simply got tired and left. Some had to go to Strasbourg for a meeting of the European Parliament. In effect, then, it was the fourth or even fifth string that was left to carry on, which enraged the Africans, who saw serious economic problems deliberately slighted.

The Africans threatened to take their case to the arbitration court that is part of the machinery in their association agreement with the Europeans.

The court has never been used; invoking it would have signaled the breakdown of diplomacy.

Recognizing the seriousness of the matter, one of the few remaining ministers, Gaston Thorn of Luxembourg, suggested that a mediation effort be tried. When Italy objected, the matter went to an unusual vote in the Council, in which Italy was overruled. Then Mr. Rey was prevailed upon to act.

For their part, the Italians are upset. Their position is that every time the Economic Community wants to be generous to the Africans it is Italy that pays because she has competing products.

Officials believe that the only way the problem can be resolved is for the Italians to be on the receiving end of generous development grants. Then it would be the West Germans, the Dutch or even the French who would pay.

Fair East

NEW YORK TIMES
18 October 1972

KISSINGER FLYING TO SOUTH VIETNAM AFTER PARIS TALKS

Washington Signs Indicate
Cease-Fire Negotiations
Are at Critical Point

SAIGON CHIEFS CONFER

While Progress Is Hinted,
U.S. Aides Are Uncertain
About Thieu's Reaction

By MAX FRANKEL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17—

Henry A. Kissinger was flying tonight from another meeting with the North Vietnamese in Paris to a meeting with the South Vietnamese in Saigon amid strong indications throughout the Government that negotiations for an Indochina cease-fire had reached a critical point.

Almost nothing is being said here about the substance of the negotiations. And no one will speak in public even about their atmosphere.

Several informed officials suggested, however, that there had been considerably more progress between American and North Vietnamese negotiators than had been acknowledged so far. But there was uncertainty here about the reaction of President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam to the negotiations.

Pace in Saigon Accelerates

In Saigon, as in Washington, the pace of high-level meetings was accelerating. President Thieu held a second daylong conference with key aides and Cabinet officers.

Diplomatic reports relayed from Hanoi by third countries suggest some optimism in the North Vietnamese capital. But they also record a continuing emphasis on the problems that remain — including disagreements between the North Vietnamese and their southern allies, the Vietcong.

Some of the patterns of combat in recent days in hamlets

close to Saigon have been interpreted as contests for maximum political advantage in case of a military standstill.

Optimism in Laos

And from Laos have come reports of the first promising negotiations in two years between the pro-Communist Pathet Lao and the neutralist Government in Vientiane. The two sides are talking about the "normalization" of their virtual partition of the country. Laotian officials are optimistic in their reports to Washington because the Pathet Lao have dropped a long standing demand that an agreement must include the cessation of American bombing of the Communist supply trails through Laos, from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

Although these signs of motion and progress offer obvious political advantage to President Nixon in his bid for reelection, the White House and other official Government spokesmen have tried to dampen speculation. There has been no organized effort—as there often has before—to convey a political or propaganda message. On the contrary, officials who normally deal with reporters are urging them to be cautious with the available evidence.

The White House dealt as blandly as possible with the announcements of M. Kissinger's travels. It issued a statement at 6 A.M. that the President's adviser on national security was in Paris, with four aides and William H. Sullivan, an Indochina expert and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, for a meeting with Xuan Thuy, Hanoi's permanent representative at the peace talks. They had met for four days last week. Also participating in those talks was Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's principal negotiator, who reported in person to his fellow members of the Politburo today.

Ziegler Tells of Trip

At 11:30 A.M., Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, announced that the Kissinger party was ready to fly to Saigon to continue "the regular consultative process" with President Thieu. Mr. Kissinger last visited Saigon in August. His deputy, Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., conferred with President Thieu before joining the Paris talks last week.

Mr. Ziegler said today's brief Paris contact had been planned at the end of last week's four-day session and that President Nixon had ordered the visit to Saigon on the same day. Mr. Kissinger's

progress report on Friday. No time for his return was disclosed, but State Department officials said the White House party was planning to spend two days in Saigon. It will arrive there Wednesday night, Saigon time (Wednesday morning in New York).

That was the sum total of official comment.

Key Aide Called In

At the same time, however, there was a report that U. Alexis Johnson, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Mr. Kissinger's principal emergency planner, had been summoned from important personal business to confer with the President and to supervise the continuing military and political planning here for a possible cease-fire and change in the political structure of South Vietnam.

There were suggestions by Pentagon officials that Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the new Army Chief of Staff, had been rushed to Saigon not merely to study the Vietnamization program, as announced, but as Mr. Nixon's personal representative for the delicate round of consultations now under way.

The general enjoys a special confidential relationship with President Thieu, developed in his years as chief of the American military forces in South Vietnam. His testimony, both private and public, would also be vital if Mr. Nixon planned a further reduction in American military activity or total reliance on Saigon's military defenses as part of a settlement.

Military Chiefs in Saigon

Also in Saigon this week will be Adm. Noel A. M. Gayler, the new commander in chief of the Pacific command. The Americans stationed in Saigon will be led in the talks by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, the commander of American forces in Vietnam.

In the Defense Department

here, ranking military officials said a cease-fire throughout Indochina might be attained as part of a larger agreement and they stepped up their planning accordingly. One senior planner said the progress of the Paris talks had not been fully reflected in Administration comments.

Only a handful of officials in the major departments have been given access to the planning here. They have been shuttling to a series of private meetings at the White House.

Pressure on Hanoi

Both American and foreign diplomatic sources hedged their predictions of a breakthrough by pointing out that the South Vietnamese allies of both Hanoi and Washington would have to be brought into the settlement and that both had reason for suspicion and restraint.

The North Vietnamese, under pressure from their principal supplier, the Soviet Union, as well as from American aerial attacks, have shown increasing flexibility in recent weeks. They have talked informally of a willingness to "live with Thieu," diplomats report; provided the Vietcong were given some share of political power in South Vietnam.

Yesterday, Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann of France had a long meeting with Vo Van Sung, North Vietnam's chief diplomatic representative in Paris.

The French have refused all comment on renewed reports that Mr. Kissinger has asked the Paris Government to be one of several guarantors of a cease-fire. Previously, such reports were denied.

Mr. Thieu has insisted that peace is attainable only after the Communists have been defeated and has denounced the idea of a coalition as a "wicked scheme." And Vietcong representatives have found it difficult to abandon thoughts of victory, as symbolized by the overthrow of Mr. Thieu.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 October 1972

Dispute Mars Opening Of Peace Talks in Laos

VIENTIANE, Laos, Oct. 17 (Reuters)—Preliminary peace talks between the Government and the pro-Communist Pathet Lao got off to an unpromising start here today with a heated clash over the Laotian national flag.

At the opening ceremony a Pathet Lao spokesman, Sot Petrasay, objected to the presence of the Laotian flag and demanded that it be removed. But the Government

delegation leader, Pheng Phongsavan, refused, saying, "We are all Lao and must respect the national flag and monarchy."

On the suggestion of the Pathet Lao delegation leader, Gen. Phoun Sipraseth, the two sides agreed to discuss later whether the flag should continue to be displayed.

The aim of the talks is to prepare the ground for full-scale discussions between Government of Prince Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao, led by his half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 October 1972

South Korea Chief Orders Martial Law

Assembly Dissolved and All Politics Halted

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Oct. 17—President Park Chung Hee proclaimed martial law tonight throughout South Korea, suspended part of the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly and suspended all political activities.

Press censorship was also imposed, and all universities and colleges were closed.

In a statement broadcast just before the martial law went into effect at 7 P.M., Mr. Park said that the extraordinary measures were "fundamentally designed to reform the political structure" of South Korea to cope with the "rapidly changing international situation around us" and successfully carry on the current dialogue with North Korea for peaceful unification of the divided country.

Noting that the talks with the North had caused "legal and political arguments" here as to constitutionality, Mr. Park said the Cabinet would announce by Oct. 27 draft amendments to the nation's basic law with a view to laying a legal basis for the negotiations. He said the proposals would then be put to a national referendum, and he promised to restore normal constitutional order "by the end of this year at the latest."

[In Washington, State Department officials said the United States had conveyed its disapproval of the martial-law procedure "in the stiffest terms." They said that in their judgment there was no justification for the move.]

The Constitution was last amended by legislative means in 1969 to permit Mr. Park to run for his current, third consecutive four-year term, but his Democratic Republican party commanded the required two-thirds majority in the National Assembly then. The party lost that majority in elections last year, and it now holds only 114 of the 204 seats.

The Constitution now bars a fourth term.

Kim Sun Jin, the Presidential spokesman, told newsmen

shortly before Mr. Park's official announcement of martial law that there would be new Presidential and parliamentary elections on the basis of a new constitution before martial law could be lifted. He said the situation would be normalized "in about two months."

President Park did not specify in his declaration what amendments to the Constitution his Cabinet would propose. But he said that if they were not approved in the national referendum, "I will take it as an expression of the will of our people against the South-North dialogue and, therefore, will seek another new approach to the task of national unification."

The President did not elaborate on what new approach he might take.

Army Vehicles Deployed

Immediately after his statement, several army tanks and armored vehicles were deployed in front of the National Assembly building, the presidential mansion and the central Government building. Hundreds of helmeted soldiers armed with rifles took positions at key intersections in downtown Seoul.

Gen. Roh Jae Hyun, the Army Chief of Staff, who was appointed the martial law commander, decreed that all radio and television as well as press reports now had to pass through censorship and that all universities and colleges were to be closed "for the time being." He also ordered a ban on political gatherings and strikes.

Although he did not particularly mention foreign rows reports out of South Korea, official sources said that the foreign press would not be affected by the censorship order, except for radiophotos.

The general also declared that the present midnight-to-4 A.M. curfew, which has been in effect since the Korean war, would continue to be enforced. South Korea has been under a state of national emergency declared by Mr. Park last Dec. 6 to cope with what he described as the "grave situation" facing the nation as a result of the changing international situation and North Korea's "aggressive designs."

U.S. Voices Disapproval

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17—The United States has conveyed to the South Korean Government in the "stiffest terms" its disapproval of the imposition of martial law by President Park, State Department officials said today.

Secretary of State William P.

Rogers expressed the United States objections to the South Korean Ambassador, Kim Dong Jo, whom he summoned to his office last night, while the American Ambassador in Seoul, Philip C. Habib, acting on instructions, delivered a similar statement to Premier Kim Jong Pil and Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik.

State Department officials disclosed the substance of conversations with South Korean officials since late yesterday—after Premier Kim had given Mr. Habib a few hours' notice of the decision to declare martial law—emphasizing that President Park's action was highly embarrassing to the United States.

Some 40,000 United States troops are stationed in South Korea, the South Korean military forces are being modernized by the United States and Seoul receives considerable American economic assistance.

Officials here said that in view of this support, intended to stabilize the economic and political situation in South Korea and assist democratic developments, the sudden imposition of martial law was a blow to American policy.

State Department officials said privately that in their judgment there was no justifi-

cation for President Park's move, that his explanation was "not convincing," and that they believed his action was essentially an attempt to assure himself of continued power after his term expires in 1975.

Publicly, the United States' displeasure was expressed in more restrained terms by the State Department spokesman, Charles W. Bray 3d, who said that "this Government was notified of this only shortly before the announcement, it was not consulted about the decision and, obviously, is not associated with it."

While other officials said that there were no immediate plans to review American aid programs to South Korea, Mr. Bray emphasized that "we shall be watching the developments carefully and continue the discussions of this matter with the Republic of Korea."

State Department officials said that their concern here centered on making sure that the South Korean Government would refrain from drastic actions against its political opponents and an indefinite continuation of martial law.

Along these lines, Mr. Bray said that "we have noted" that President Park promised to return South Korea to democratic government. "This, in our view, is an important commitment," he declared.

JAPAN TIM S

5 October 1972

Communist Chinese Rice Drifts Into S. Viet Hands

DA NANG, Vietnam (AP) — Communist Chinese freighters are circumventing the U.S. blockade of North Vietnam by floating rice ashore—but a lot of it is winding up in the wrong hands.

Seventy-five tons of rice in waterproof bags marked "People's Republic of China" floated into Da Nang Harbor with Friday's incoming tide.

U.S. informants said the rice was in 1,500 separate bags specially rigged with plastic floats. They revealed that 1,000 such bags washed ashore a month ago on the coast near Hue 70 km. north of here.

The rice was immediately appropriated by residents of coastal fishing villages and South

Vietnamese authorities here decided to let them keep it.

Seventy-five tons is equivalent to one day's rice ration for more than 110,000 South Vietnamese soldiers.

"The Chinese had better start watching the tides more closely, unless they have a lot of rice to waste," said one U.S. officer.

Others speculated, however, that it might have been a deliberate propaganda ploy by the Chinese to show the South Vietnamese how much rice is available on the Communist side.

A third area of speculation was that the rice was intended for North Vietnamese troops occupying Quang Tri Province just below the Demilitarized Zone. They have been reported short of food.

L'Aurore, Paris
20 September 1972

Why the North Vietnamese Can't Make Up Their Minds

Six months after the unleashing of the communist offensive against South Vietnam, two months after the resumption of the sterile talks in Paris, at a time when the Viet Cong publishes a "new peace plan" coinciding with a sudden upsurge of combat on the ground, at a moment when Le Duc Tho returns to Paris to meet Mr. Kissinger, a dual observation forces itself on one: on the one hand the military and political objectives pursued by the North Vietnamese leaders have not been attained; on the other hand, despite the enormous losses already sustained, they have not renounced their efforts to obtain these objectives.

The unification of Vietnam under the control of a single power, for which they have struggled for nearly 30 years, remains the ultimate and definitive goal of all their actions.

Conceived as a slashing "Blitzkrieg" launched simultaneously on three fronts, the Communist offensive in South Vietnam intended, by a series of rapid and decisive victories, to demonstrate that the Saigon army, recruited and organized by the United States, is only "a motley collection of mercenaries" without courage and without spirit, ready to throw down their arms and run at the first encounter.

Once the army was beaten and discredited, the Southern population was to be called to insurrection and was to rise up "en masse" against the "phantom regime" of Saigon to force it to resign or to overturn it. Faced by confirmation of the failure of his Vietnamization policy, President Nixon would have had no other alternative except to ratify the "choice of the Vietnamese people" while accepting the installation in Saigon of a government of "national concord" and the unconditional retreat of the last U.S. troops still stationed South of the 17th parallel. Such was the plan drawn up by Hanoi.

It failed for two reasons. The first is that contrary to predictions and despite the very severe blows struck against it, the South Vietnamese army was not engulfed. Clinging to key points of the terrain, it held, thus proving its will to resist and its real courage.

The second reason and without doubt the most important rests in the fact that the great majority of Southern population did not rally to its "liberator." Not only did it not throw itself into their arms, but the population fled in masses away from the "liberators."

A million people have left the areas occupied by the Communists to take refuge in the cities controlled by the "phantom regime" of Saigon: cities, which, despite repeated appeals for an uprising broadcast by Radio Hanoi, have remained surprisingly calm.

But it is especially in the North, in the very interior of the territories of the DRV and among its population that the military and political check registered by the South has had the most serious repercussions.

Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01731R002200070095-1
The weight of international and naval reprisals taken by the United States are cruelly felt. The closing of the ports, the systematic destruction of industrial installations and of fuel depots, the disruption of the means of communications have caused a fall in production, have engendered administrative confusion, have disorganized transport, interrupted or seriously retarded the collection and distribution of food products.

Products of prime necessity, such as coal, oil, meat, textiles, soap, matches are strictly rationed. Manufactured goods, and small wares cannot be found anywhere. Sending all able-bodied men to the front, pressing women and old people to coastal defense or to repairing roads, evacuation of children far from threatened centers have meant dislocation of families.

The transfer of urban populations to a countryside ill-prepared to receive them has provoked numerous incidents between rural and city dwellers. Exhausted by long years of struggle and burdensome work harshly tested by the disastrous floods of last year (whose effects are still being felt), people impoverished and in mourning for too many dear ones lost or killed in combat, no longer listen to slogans and believe less in a victory whose arrival is reported constantly.

For many months the Hanoi press and radio has made public announcements of "concerted efforts at sabotage and treason." Thus despite the tight control exercised over the population by the cadres of a single, rigorously structured party and by a security service of a rare efficacy, the Hanoi leaders now find themselves confronted by a real opposition. It is no longer merely a question of individuals who are unassimilable or motivated by the idea of personal profit but of organized groups -- the Catholic Church, Montagnard tribes, espionage and sabotage networks -- committing acts strongly hostile to the Communist system and to the persecution of the war.

To these serious internal difficulties are added new complications on the international level. Because the Vietnam war is too long, too costly, because it has killed too many, destroyed too much, produced too much talk and too much writing, it has disheartened the American public. But a similar weariness has finally reached, in their turn, leading Soviet and Chinese circles.

After years of technical, economic and military assistance granted to numerous countries of the third world, such as Cuba, Iraq and Egypt, Moscow has taken stock. With regard to funds invested -- and they must be numbered in billions of rubles -- the advantages reaped in exchange are hardly encouraging.

The considerable and constant aid furnished to North Vietnam for 18 years has been particularly costly. . . and nothing remains of it. All the factories, cement plants, the port installations, constructed and then reconstructed three, four, even five times, have been reduced to dust or burned up by American bombers. The Russians have also given the North Vietnamese Army modern, sophisticated materiel, transported at great cost and difficult to replace. They have reproached the Army for having utilized it very badly (especially the tanks) and for having ventured on a technological confrontation which very quickly turned to its disadvantage. Peking for its part reproaches General Giap for having renounced the Maoist scheme of revolutionary warfare, distinguished by its emphasis on the superiority of doctrine and the militant guerrilla over technology and the mechanic soldier, and for having adopted a conventional strategy based primarily on the superiority of materiel.

The Chinese are all the more irritated because the materiel in question exposes too obviously the preponderance of aid given by the Soviets. This draws attention to the fact that while the North Vietnamese tanks destroyed at Loc, surrounded Kontum, and threatened Hue, they have not succeeded (apart from Quang Tri) in taking any large city. Four years earlier -- without tanks, without infrared rockets, and without artillery -- and during a time when there were still 500,000 American soldiers in Vietnam, Giap's troops had nevertheless occupied Hue and struck at the heart of Saigon.

Furthermore, Peking loses no opportunity to put the Soviets on the spot. Two weeks ago, a 2,500-ton Chinese mine sweeper which had left Canton eight days earlier entered Haiphong harbor at high tide after making its way through the U.S. mine fields. A symbolic mission without practical military consequences, strictly intended to prove to the North Vietnamese the "duplicity" of the Russians, who despite having a fleet of 300 mine sweepers, have not once tried to force the American blockade.

The ideological conflict separating People's China and the Soviet Union, the struggle for influence which they face brings it about that neither Moscow nor Peking are in a position to make Hanoi listen to them. Especially since the disappearance from the scene of Ho Chin Minh, the friend of Stalin and of Marxist Trotsky before Mao and Chou En-lai, former representative of the Comintern in Southeast Asia, "Father of the Vietnamese Revolution."

His titles and virtues were not disputed by anyone. Respected in foreign capitals, he was obeyed in the Party and followed by the people, for whom he was the incarnation of the spirit of resistance.

Realist, perfectly informed on international problems, capable of moderation and great political flexibility when circumstances required, Ho Chi Minh possessed the prestige and authority necessary to conduct negotiations on his own terms, to accept a compromise, to make peace, and, if needed, to impose it on his camp.

The political void left by his death has not been overcome. None of his heirs, Communists of the second rank and lesser experience, do not have the stature to assume his role as international interlocutor, unique leader, arbitrator. His nominal successor to the presidency of the republic, Ton Duc Thang, an old, 84-year-old southerner, plays only a figurative role.

Ho Chin Minh's most faithful disciple, Premier Pham Van Dong, from a Mandarin family, cautious and a remarkable administrator, alone capable of maintaining the equilibrium among rival factions in the Politburo, is gravely ill, suffering, it is thought, of throat cancer; Giap, the prestigious conqueror of Dien Bien Phu, no longer enjoys the same popularity. The checking of his Blitzkrieg and the heavy losses in men and materiel, for which he is held responsible, have lowered his credit. Frictions are increasing between the current Party Secretary Le Duan and his predecessor Truong Chinh, now President of the Assembly, whose influence continues to grow.

The frequent discords dividing the leadership of the North produces a state of tension and mistrust which does not permit any of them enough authority or margin of maneuver to act in a decisive fashion in favor of peace. The election of Tran Quoc Hoan, "the super-cop," to the Politburo for the first time, is indicative of the climate of mistrust. It indicates at the highest echelon of power in the country a clear tightening of police

The result is that at a time when the whole world waits for and foresees an early end to the war by a negotiated settlement, the fighting intensifies, the intransigent ones become set in their position and the wished for peace once again seems uncertain and elusive before the law of the cannon.

**VIETNAM: On n'a jamais eu de cesse
parlé de paix et pourtant les
combats ne cessent de s'intensifier...**

Voici pourquoi les nord-vietnamiens n'arrivent pas à se décider

SIX mois après le déclenchement de l'offensive communiste contre le Sud-Vietnam, deux mois après la reprise stérile des pourparlers de Paris, à l'heure où le G.R.P. publie un « nouveau plan de paix » coïncidant avec une brusque relance des combats sur le terrain, au moment où M. Le Duc Tho revient à Paris pour y rencontrer M. Kissinger, une double évidence s'impose à tous les observateurs : d'une part, les objectifs militaires et politiques poursuivis par les dirigeants nord-vietnamiens n'ont pas été atteints ; d'autre part, en dépit des pertes énormes déjà subies, ils n'ont pas renoncé à les atteindre.

L'unification du Vietnam sous le contrôle d'un seul pouvoir pour laquelle ils luttent depuis près de trente ans, demeure le but ultime et définitif de toutes leurs actions.

Conçue comme une « guerre-éclair », conduite à grands coups de boutoir lancés simultanément sur trois fronts, l'offensive communiste au Sud-Vietnam se proposait par une série de victoires rapides et décisives de faire la démonstration que l'armée de Saigon, recrutée et organisée par les Etats-Unis, n'était qu'un « ramassis de mercenaires », sans courage et

contre-révolutionnaires et tous ceux qui critiquent la poursuite de la lutte ».

« Les activités communes de ces troupes, précise-t-il, se traduisent par l'achat des hommes, la contre-propagande, les calomnies répandues contre le régime pour abaisser le parti et diviser le peuple. Les forces les plus dangereuses qui se livrent au torpillage de la révolution socialiste au Nord sont invariablement les mêmes : les espions des impérialistes français, hier ; toutes sortes d'espions des agents américains et de leurs valets, aujourd'hui... »

« Ces espions, souligne le ministre, sont bien équipés et disposent de moyens techniques modernes. Ils trouvent aide et appui dans les rangs de la population de la R.D.V. grâce à la présence de réactionnaires vietnamiens, notamment ceux qui agissent sous le manteau du christianisme (les catholiques sont plus de 600.000 au Nord), ceux qui se trouvent dans le clergé et dans les minorités ethniques du Nord-Ouest (600.000 montagnards, thaïs, thos, muong, colos et nêos qui s'opposent à l'implantation de paysans nord-vietnamiens, dans leur région). Ils ont encore d'autres « ouïsses », des anciens fonctionnaires, d'anciens propriétaires fonciers dépossédés par la révolution, des bourgeois, des intellectuels révisionnistes, des femmes dépravées. Tous se livrent au renseignement militaire, politique et économique

sans civisme, prêts à jeter leurs armes et à s'enfuir aux premiers chocs.

Une fois l'armée battue et discréditée, la population sudiste appelée à l'insurrection devait se dresser en masse contre le « régime fantoche » de Saigon pour le contraindre à la démission ou le renverser. Placé devant le constat de faillite de sa politique de vietnamisation, le président Nixon n'aurait eu alors d'autre alternative que d'entériner le « choix du peuple vietnamien » en acceptant la mise en place à Saigon d'un gouvernement de « concorde nationale » et le retrait inconditionnel des dernières troupes U.S. encore stationnées au sud du 17^e parallèle. Tel était le plan arrêté par Hanoi.

Il a échoué pour deux raisons. La première est que contrairement aux prévisions et malgré les coups très durs qui lui étaient assénés, l'armée sud-vietnamienne ne s'est pas effondrée. Accrochée aux points essentiels du terrain, elle a tenu, prouvant ainsi sa volonté de résistance et une réelle valeur.

Répercussions

La seconde raison et sans doute la plus importante réside dans le fait que la population sudiste dans sa grande majorité ne s'est pas ralliée à ses « libérateurs ». Non seulement elle ne s'est pas jetée dans leurs bras, mais elle a fui en bloc devant eux.

Un million de personnes ont abandonné les zones investies par les communistes pour se réfugier dans les villes contrôlées par le « régime fantoche » de Saigon. Des villes qui, malgré les appels répétés au soulèvement lancés par radio-Hanoi, sont demeurées d'un calme surprenant.

Mais c'est au Nord surtout. A l'intérieur même du territoire de la R.D.V. et de sa population que l'échec militaire et politique enre-

liste au Sud connaît les plus graves répercussions.

Le poids d'une guerre interminable, l'ampleur des représailles aériennes et navales exercées par les Etats-Unis sont cruellement ressenties. La fermeture des ports, la destruction systématique des installations industrielles, des dépôts de carburant, le démantèlement des voies de communications ont provoqué une chute sensible de la production, engendré la confusion administrative, désorganisé les transports, interrompu ou sérieusement ralenti le ramassage et la distribution des denrées alimentaires.

Les produits de première nécessité, tels que le charbon, l'huile, la viande, les tissus, le savon, les alimentes sont sévèrement rationnés. Les objets manufacturés, les articles de mercerie sont devenus introuvables. L'envoi de tous les hommes valides au front, l'affectation des femmes et des vieillards à la défense côtière, dans la DCA ou à la réparation des routes, l'évacuation des enfants loin des centres menacés ont entraîné la dislocation des familles.

Le transfert des populations urbaines dans les campagnes mal préparées à les recevoir a provoqué de nombreux incidents entre citadins et ruraux. Epuisé par de longues années de lutte et de travaux harassants, durement éprouvé par les inondations désastreuses de l'an dernier dont les effets se font encore sentir, le peuple appauvri et en deuil de trop des siens disparus ou tués au combat rechigne à suivre les mots d'ordre et croit moins à une victoire dont l'échéance est sans cesse reportée. Depuis plusieurs mois déjà, la presse et le radio de Hanoi font publiquement état de « tentatives concertées de sabotage et de trahison ».

Des articles révélateurs

De nombreux articles parus dans « Hoc Tap » (Études), la revue idéologique du Parti, sous la signature de personnalités importantes, telles que Hoang Guoc Viet, procureur général du tribunal suprême populaire et président de la Confédération des syndicats, dressent de violents réquisitoires contre « ceux qui détournent les biens du peuple », « remettent des faux rapports de gestion », « établissent des comptes fantômes », « se livrent à la spéculation », au troc, à la contrebande, à la corruption. Dans un « appel à la répression de toutes les forces antiguerre », publié et commenté dans la même revue, Tran Quoc Hoan, ministre de la Sécurité, dénonce et menace d'extermination « les espions », les « pour le compte de l'ennemi ». Ils sapent le moral du peuple. Ils ont recourus à la guerre psychologique pour semer des troubles, commettre des assassinats de cadres, rassembler des forces dans l'intention de détruire le pouvoir révolutionnaire et d'abolir le régime socialiste, soit par la violence, soit par le processus d'évolution pacifique. »

Opposition

Ainsi, malgré le contrôle étroit exercé sur la population par les cadres d'un parti unique rigoureusement structuré et des services de sécurité d'une rare efficacité, les dirigeants de Hanoi se trouvent maintenant confrontés à une véritable opposition. Il ne s'agit plus seulement d'individus inassimilables ou motivés par la notion de profit, mais de groupes organisés — Église catholique, tribus montagnardes, réseaux d'espionnage et de saboteurs — commettant des actes résolument hostiles au système communiste et à la poursuite de la guerre.

À ces difficultés intérieures sérieuses s'ajoutent de nouvelles complications d'ordre international. La guerre du Vietnam, parce qu'elle était trop longue, trop chère, qu'elle tuait trop, détruisait trop, faisait trop parler et trop écrire, a mené l'opinion américaine jusqu'à l'échecurement. Et une même lassitude a fini par atteindre à leur tour les sphères dirigeantes soviétiques et chinoises.

Après des années d'assistance technique, économique et militaire accordées à de nombreux pays du Tiers monde, tels que Cuba, l'Iraq ou l'Égypte, Moscou a fait ses comptes. Au regard des fonds investis — chiffrables par centaines de milliards de roubles — les avantages recueillis en échange ne sont guère encourageants.

L'aide considérable et constante fournie au Nord-Vietnam depuis dix-huit ans a été particulièrement coûteuse... et il n'en reste rien. Toutes les usines, les cimenteries, les installations portuaires, construites et reconstruites, trois, quatre et même cinq fois, ont été réduites en poussière ou en fumée par les bombardiers américains. Les Russes avaient aussi doté l'armée nord-vietnamienne d'un matériel moderne et sophistiqué, transporté à grands frais et difficile à remplacer. Ils lui reprochent de l'avoir très mal utilisé (surtout les chars) et d'aventuré dans une confrontation technologique qui a tourné très vite à son désavantage. Pékin, de son côté, reproche au général Giap d'avoir renoncé au schéma maoïste de la guerre révolutionnaire, marqué par la supériorité de la doctrine et du guerillero-militant sur la technique et le soldat-mécanicien. Il lui reproche une stratégie conventionnelle fondée principalement sur la supériorité du matériel.

Vide politique

Les Chinois sont d'autant plus irrités que le matériel en cause expose de façon trop

tentative la prépondérance de l'aide soviétique. Ils font remarquer que les chars nord-vietnamiens s'ils ont détruit An-Loc, encerclé Kontum, menacé Hué n'ont réussi par contre — Quang-Tri mis à part — à enlever aucune grande ville. Quatre ans plus tôt, sans blindés, sans fusées infrarouges et sans artillerie, alors que 500.000 soldats américains se trouvaient encore au Vietnam, les troupes de Giap avaient pourtant occupé Hué et frappé en plein cœur de Saigon.

Pékin ne perd, en outre, aucune occasion de placer les Soviétiques en porte à faux. Voici deux semaines, un dragueur de mines chinois de 250 tonnes parti huit jours plus tôt de Canton, entré à marée haute dans le port de Haiphong, après s'être frayé un chemin à travers les champs de mines U.S. Mission symbolique, sans conséquences militaires pratiques, strictement destinée à prouver aux Nord-Vietnamiens la « duplicité » des Russes qui, bien que disposant d'une flotte de 300 dragueurs, n'ont pas tenté une seule fois de forcer le blocus américain.

Le conflit idéologique séparant la Chine populaire et l'Union soviétique, la lutte d'influence qui les oppose, font que ni Moscou ni Pékin ne sont en mesure de se faire écouter à Hanoi. Surtout depuis la disparition du président Ho Chi Minh, ami de Staline et de Trotski marxiste avant Mao et Chou En-lai, ancien délégué du Komintern pour le sud-est asiatique, « Père de la Révolution vietnamienne ».

Ses titres et ses mérites n'étaient discutés par personne. Respecté dans les capitales étrangères, il était obéi dans le parti et suivi par le peuple pour qui il incarnait l'esprit de la résistance.

Réaliste, parfaitement informé des problèmes internationaux, capable de modération et d'une grande souplesse politique quand les circonstances l'exigeaient, Ho Chi Minh possédait le prestige et l'autorité nécessaires pour conduire une négociation à son terme, accepter un compromis pour faire la paix et au besoin l'imposer à son camp.

Le vide politique laissé par sa mort n'a pas été comblé. Aucun de ses héritiers, communistes de second plan et de formation intérieure ne paraît en mesure d'assumer son rôle d'interlocuteur international, de chef unique et d'arbitre. Son remplaçant nominal à la présidence de la République, Ton duc Thang, un vieux Sudiste âgé de 84 ans, ne joue en fait qu'un rôle figuratif.

Le plus fidèle disciple d'Ho Chi Minh, le Premier ministre Pham-van-Dong, issu d'une famille de mandarins, homme pondéré et remarquable administrateur, seul capable de maintenir l'équilibre entre les factions rivales du Politburo, est gravement malade, atteint, croit-on, d'un cancer à la gorge. Giap, le prestigieux vainqueur de Dien Bien Phu, ne jouit plus de la même popularité. L'échec de sa « guerre éclair » et les très lourdes pertes en hommes et en matériel, dont il est tenu pour responsable, ont entamé son crédit. Les frictions se multiplient entre l'actuel secrétaire du parti, Le Duan et son prédécesseur Truong Chinh, président de l'Assemblée, dont l'influence ne cesse de grandir.

Les fréquents désaccords divisant les dirigeants du Nord produisent un état de tension et de méfiance qui ne laisse à aucun d'entre eux assez d'autorité ou de marge de manœuvre pour agir de façon décisive en faveur de la paix. L'élection, pour la première fois, au bureau politique de Tran Quoc Hoan « superflic » du régime, est significative de ce climat de méfiance. Elle marque, à l'échelon le plus élevé du pays, un net resserrement du contrôle policier, un raidissement de la volonté de lutte. Elle bloque toute tentative de compromis.

De sorte qu'au moment où tout le monde attend et prédit la fin prochaine de la guerre par un règlement négocié, les combats s'intensifient, les intransigences s'affirment et la paix tant espérée paraît toujours aussi incertaine et recule une fois de plus devant la loi des canons.

WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1972

Terrorists Kill 15 On Thailand Border

BANGKOK, Oct. 17 (AP)—
Terrorists killed 15 border policemen and militiamen over the weekend in two raids against government posts 350 northeast of Bangkok.

One raid occurred in Sakon Nakorn province, where about 20 insurgents attacked a defense post with grenades and rockets and killed eight of the 12 policemen, the government said. About five hours later, 50 men attacked another post in Kalasin province. Seven police and militia men were killed in the 30-minute battle and two militiamen were kidnapped.

SAIGON POST
27 Sept. 1972

EDITORIAL

Dispensers Of Death

From the so-called «Golden Triangle» bounded by Northeast Burma, Southwest China and Thailand originates 700 tons of illegally produced opium, roughly half of the world's current annual production of 1,300 tons.

The bulk of the raw opium produced in about 650 square miles of the «Golden Triangle» is processed into heroin for the consumption of addicts in the Southeast Asian region. There is evidence, however, that traffickers in the Triangle are making a bid for the international narcotics market.

Greater vigilance by the police in Saigon, Bangkok and Hong Kong have resulted in significant arrests and seizures of narcotics recently. In Saigon, the national police seized a notorious and elusive opium dealer and 14 of his men, members of a ring linked with operations in Laos, Hong Kong and Thai-

land. In June and July this year, Thai narcotics agents seized a total of 3,850 kilograms of raw opium, 212 kilograms of morphine, and 353 kilograms of heroin. Hong Kong agents raiding opium dens and manufacturing plants last week arrested 49 Chinese.

The recent arrests by the Saigon police have resulted in a reported increase in the street price of a vial of heroin from 1 to 9 U.S. dollars. Emphasizing the Republic of Vietnam's concern over the narcotics threat to this country is the death penalty ordered by President Nguyen Van Thieu for any person belonging to organizations peddling opium, heroin, or other hard drugs.

We cannot afford to take lightly this serious danger posed by drugs to our people and consequently to the energy and vitality of the nation. This trafficking in dangerous drugs must be stopped before it destroys our youth, causes misery for our parents, and brings anguish to our nation.

It is tragic to be murdered, but at least one dies quickly. Death by narcotics is a slow and painful death. It is time this nation showed its wrath by showing no mercy to dispensers of death who prey on humanity for monetary gain.

WASHINGTON STAR
17 October 1972

Japan's Defense

The decision of the Japanese government to double its military spending over the next five years reflects two strong trends. The first is a determination to pursue a foreign policy more independent of the United States than has been possible in the past. The second is a diminishing Japanese concern over a hostile reaction from Communist China to a buildup of defense capability.

Over lively opposition from left-wing political parties, the government of Premier Kakuei Tanaka has decided to spend some \$15 billion for Japan's fourth five-year defense plan, more than double the \$7.6 billion of the current five-year program. Most of the money apparently will go for new types of tanks and armored cars and for the manufacture in Japan of two types of training and ground-support military aircraft, previously bought from the United States.

Until Tanaka's visit to Peking and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with mainland China last month, the announcement of such a military buildup would have presented serious diplomatic problems for the Japanese government. The danger of a revival of Japanese militarism has been a constant theme of Chinese propaganda for years and has inhibited the modest defense efforts made by Japan in the past. Nothing on the subject has been heard from Peking in recent weeks.

The United States, for its part, has long been prodding the Japanese to build a self-defense force more commensurate with its industrial strength. The main thrust of the new program is to create an industrial and technological infrastructure that will make Japan less reliant on its treaty connections with the United States for its essential security and more capable of playing an independent political role in Asia, where its economic power is predominant.

It would be a mistake, however, to exaggerate the significance of the present military buildup. Japan's defense strategy is still limited to the suppression of internal disorders and to repelling a limited conventional attack. There is, however, no question of nuclear armaments and Japan is still completely dependent on the United States for strategic deterrence.

Nor have Japan's weaker neighbors much cause of concern about a revival of Japanese militarism. The defense forces have no mission outside of the home islands and Okinawa, for whose defense Japan has recently reassumed responsibility. Tanaka is emphasizing the point that Japan will not be so "presumptuous" as to try to act as a mediator between China and other Asian nations. And indeed, the evidence is clear that the Japanese aspire to no military role in Asia for the foreseeable future.

THE NATION, Bangkok Friday, August 18, 1972.

Vietnamese girls used to gather intelligence

Vietnamese girls are always used to collect intelligence about Thai authorities and their movements although the White Paper does not say how effective this measure is.

"The Vietnamese refugees would try to become familiar with Thai officials in an attempt to gather information about government movements which would aid them in the plotting of sabotage activities," the paper says.

The White Paper underscores several sabotage attempts by the refugees. It cites the case in Udon Thani in 1968 and Ubon in 1970 when Communist terrorists

DAY THREE

sneaked into the air bases there to carry out a subversion mission, resulting in an exchange of gunfire with government authorities.

"The bodies found in these cases were those resembling Vietnamese," the paper reports.

It has been established, the paper says, that the refugees, particularly those in the bordering provinces of Nong Khai, Nakhon Phanom and Ubon Ratchathani, have played an important part in assisting Communist terrorists in the country. "They provide shelter for those terrorists who cross the border to study in

Hanoi and Laos and later come back to carry out subversive actions here," the paper says.

It is also reported that some Vietnamese refugees are directly involved in the insurgent movement, some of them serving as group leaders and advisers.

There have been frequent violations of official regulations among the refugees, the paper charges.

"Many of them leave their confined areas without getting prior permission and others hold demonstrations and create chaos in official premises by protesting against official orders or seeking the release of their colleagues.

"The government believes that such disorderly conditions are brought about through instigation of the clandestine organisation which has unnecessarily affected those law-abiding and well-behaved refugees," the paper says.

Turning to the support provided by Laotian Communists to local insurgents, the paper says that such a threat is all the more significant since, apart from direct assistance

given by the Laotian Communists, they have also served as a channel through which assistance by the North Vietnamese and Chinese reaches Thailand.

The kind of assistance provided by Laotian Communists to local insurgents include indoctrination, weapons and access to Communist propaganda.

A defector, Mr Lee Promchan from Sakon Nakhon, relates how he was used to serve as a link between the Laotian Communists and the local terrorists.

Lee said before he left Laos for Thailand, a Mr Chavalit Tabkwa, who had been assigned by "higher authorities" to supervise all Thai insurgents in Laos told a Mr Suan (one of the 50 insurgents trained in Laos) to establish contacts with members of the Thai Communist Party in order to arrange an escape route through which the Thais could return to Thailand in long-tail boats.

"Before departure," Lee told investigators after his defection in 1968, "everyone was given a personal gun and some ammunition. Most of the weapons were American-made which made it easier for us to obtain spare parts and additional ammunition." They were also told that the Americans should be killed with American weapons. Everyone was dressed in green, complete with knapsacks."

THE NATION, Bangkok
20 August 1972

BORDER REDS

DAY FOUR

"Chinese" guerillas on the Thai-Malaysian border, estimated at more than 1,200 strong, are apparently forcing a link with the local insurgents in Thailand, the White Paper issued by the Communist Suppression Operation Command (CSOC) confirms.

It says that the guerillas who are part of the Communist Party

in Malaysia have been spreading anti-Thai propaganda and instigating Muslim residents in the southern provinces to rise up against the authorities.

"Moreover," the White Paper says, "the joint Thai-Malaysian suppression force have encountered serious resistance from these subversive elements who have their hideouts along the rugged Thai-Malaysian border."

About 500 members of the Malayan Communist Party fled into Thailand after the emergency situation in Malaya some 12 years ago.

The White Paper does not identify the leader of these guerillas by name but it says: "The present leader is still the same person as when the guerillas fled from Malaya."

Lower-ranking members of the movement, the paper says, comprise young violent

FORCE

LINKS

White Paper

youth of Chinese ancestry who had been persuaded to join the Communist movement from local villages along the border.

In 1967, a unit of Thai government forces raided a Chinese guerilla camp in Betong, Yala. The raid produced several important documents which proved that the camp also served as a large-scale military and political training centre.

The White Paper also discusses how Communist terrorists infiltrate into the more than 500,000 hilltribes in various parts of the country.

The hilltribesmen, who migrated into the country about 80 years ago, began to create a social problem when they violated the law of the land by growing opium and conducted shift cultivation which resulted in vast forested areas being denuded, the White Paper

WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1972

Japanese Aide Here for Talks

Associated Press

Japan's foreign minister, Masayoshi Chira arrived yesterday for talks with President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers on China and the Vietnam reconstruction problem after the war is settled.

The Japanese diplomat, who negotiated with Prime Minis-

ter Kakuei Tanaka in normalizing relations with Peking, has briefed the leaders of Australia and New Zealand on details of those talks and will do the same when he meets Secretary Rogers today and President Nixon on Friday. He is on his way to the United Nations, London and Moscow for the same purpose.

(Conclusion)

Western Hemisphere

WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1972

Allende Warns of Civil War Possibility

From News Dispatches

SANTIAGO, Oct. 17—Chile's President Salvador Allende said tonight that Chile is "on the verge of civil war."

A short time before he made the statement, the Chilean Army imposed a midnight-to-6 a.m. curfew on Santiago province.

For the second consecutive day, riot police clashed with rival political factions battling in the streets of Santiago, as strikes continued to spread.

Washington Post staff correspondent Lewis H. Diuguid reported from the scene that reports from the major cities indicated that the opposition had been partly successful in its efforts to embarrass Allende with its passive resistance tactics, but that Santiago itself was far from paralyzed.

Many categories of workers and professionals who were called out on strike were apparently divided down the middle, with many pro-government personnel staying on the job.

Many persons dismissed the predictions of civil war and predicted the strike would end inconclusively.

In typically Chilean style, the parties opposed to Allende joined the members of his coalition in denouncing the efforts of the American-based Kennecott Copper Co. to have Chilean copper shipments abroad impounded to cover part of the company's compensation claims for its nationalized properties here.

Most of the statements denouncing Kennecott failed to distinguish between the actions of the company and of the U.S. government. In the midst of all these statements, however, Allende was cordially receiving a pair of touring American astronauts at the presidential palace.

Later, referring to the political crisis, the president said in a palace ceremony tonight that Chileans "will live through many difficult hours, soon."

"We are on the verge of civil war," he said. "These are difficult moments ahead of

us."

Earlier, the opposition Christian Democratic Party, which supports the strikes, rejected an invitation to meet with Allende to discuss the crisis.

During the day, police fired tear-gas grenades and used a watercannon to disperse demonstrators in the center of the city. A police official said "many people" were arrested.

In announcing the curfew on the capital area, which has a population of 3.3 million, Gen. Hector Bravo warned that soldiers would fire on anyone who failed to halt for identification.

During debate on the strikes in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies today, angry deputies hurled their water glasses and ash trays. The disturbance lasted for 30 minutes. Allende's sister, Laura, a Socialist Party Deputy, was slightly injured when struck on the hand by a glass.

For the second time in less than 30 hours, the main rail line between Santiago and the port of Valparaiso was cut by a bomb blast.

The current crisis began last Wednesday, when truckers throughout the nation struck to protest plans to set up a state-operated trucking concern in Aysen Province, a cattle region 800 miles south of Santiago. The truckers charged that the plan was the first step toward nationalization of their industry.

More than 80 per cent of the nation's shops and stores closed Friday and Saturday in support of the strike.

The lines hardened Sunday when the nation's opposition political parties announced their support of the strike, and the government ordered shopkeepers to reopen Monday or face a takeover of their businesses.

Physicians, merchant marine captains, private school students and many bank employees joined the walkouts today, and the Santiago lawyers association urged the regional bar association to call a strike of all attorneys.

Bus owners also announced they would join the work stoppage at midnight.

As the scope of the strikes broadened Allende asked Mig-

uel Jacob, president of the Chilean Association of Professional Organizations, to draw up a plan to mediate the walkouts.

Jacob accepted the request, but noted that the truck drivers, whose strike last week precipitated the mass walkout, already had rejected mediation efforts by the bus drivers union.

Soldiers carrying automatic rifles guarded the few banks that opened today with skeleton staffs manned by executives. Riot police and soldiers riding in jeeps patrolled the capital's downtown area. Some shops reopened voluntarily for the first time in several days after participating in the earlier phase of the strikes.

The government declared Aconcagua Province, 120 miles north of Santiago, an emergency zone. Aconcagua became the 18th of Chile's 25 provinces covered by the emergency decree—a form of martial law.

Dutch Court Orders Copper Seized

From News Dispatches

ROTTERDAM, Oct. 17—The Rotterdam District Court ordered the seizure of all the Chilean copper aboard the West German freighter Birte Oldendorff if the copper is unloaded, court sources said here today.

The order was made at the request of the American Braden Kennecott Co., which claims the copper originates from its plant which the Chilean government has nationalized without compensation.

In Paris, meanwhile, four of the world's main copper-exporting nations—Chile, Zambia, Peru and Zaire—announced that their mining ministers would meet next month in Chile to work out a response to Kennecott's campaign against Chilean copper exports.

WASHINGTON POST
13 October 1972

Women MPs in Uruguay

Reuter

MONTEVIDEO, Oct. 12—The Uruguayan army is forming a women's military police corps to guard women held as suspected urban guerrillas.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
27 September 1972

Red Tape in Chile Hampers Travel Abroad

BY DAVID F. BELNAP

Times Staff Writer

SANTIAGO — Bureaucratic barriers make it increasingly hard for Chilean citizens to journey beyond the borders of their country but not for the dark reasons many disappointed would-be travelers believe.

"Chile hasn't become an Iron Curtain country whose authorities close their borders to keep people from 'escaping' to somewhere else," the sales manager for an international airline said. "It's largely a question of finances."

He meant the country's finances as a nation. Travel beyond national boundaries, including air or other transport, must be paid for in dollars or other hard currency bought with local currency from the Central Bank.

Short of Currency

The Central Bank, however, is running a minus foreign exchange balance, meaning that it must scrape to find enough hard currency to cover such high-priority current expenses as importation of food and medicines. Foreign travel for citizens is far down on the list of priorities.

That doesn't mean a determined citizen can't make a trip. But an expensive, time-consuming process, with a potential hazard or two along the way, must be completed before he can board that plane bound for another country.

For a tourist visiting Chile from elsewhere, the official exchange rate is 46 units of Chilean currency,

called escudos, for one dollar. Because of taxes and other charges, a Chilean tourist wanting to travel abroad must shell out three times that many escudos for each dollar of travel expense.

Strict Quotas

So the cost of round-trip economy class air transportation from here to New York, for example, is roughly equal to the annual per-capita income of Chile's citizens. Moreover, travelers' checks or other foreign exchange for food, lodging and miscellaneous expenses is doled out in strict quotas, depending on the traveler's destination. A maximum of \$550 is allowed per year per traveler.

Before he can buy a ticket, an aspiring Chilean traveler must get a clearance from the Finance Ministry certifying that he is up to date in his income tax payments. This was always a requirement, but it

now takes three times as long to "process" the clearance as it used to.

The would-be traveler must also get someone to guarantee in writing that he will be responsible for all tax debts accruing to the traveler while the latter is out of the country. This requirement is also standard, but now a guarantor must be in a higher tax bracket than the traveler. A recent top-bracket voyager had to get six joint guarantors before he was able to leave the country.

Under a new procedure, the traveler must demonstrate that he can afford his proposed trip. If his income, as shown on his tax return, does not prove he is clearly able to afford to travel, he must explain where he plans to get the money to pay for his journey. This measure discourages wanderlust in many who would rather let sleeping tax inspectors

lie. Even after clearing away the red tape and getting his ticket and slender book of travelers' checks, the journey taker has a final hurdle to cross. His luggage is inspected at the airport to make sure he is not departing with heirlooms, works of art, the family silver, unreasonable amounts of personal jewelry or any money not strictly accounted for.

An opposition newspaper recently complained that Chile's Marxist-oriented regime applied hobbies indiscriminately to citizens going abroad for business, educational and health reasons as well as to those traveling purely for pleasure. It also charged that government functionaries enjoyed privileged travel status in spite of pre-election promises to hold official junketing to a drastic minimum.

Travel Business Off
Whatever the com-

plaints, the restrictions are having their effect. Some travel agencies report business off up to 90%, and all international airlines agree that travel out of Chile is down. Nearly a year ago one of the latter made a load projection for 1972, missing eventual reality by 85%.

Another carrier, which does not fly to Chile but maintains a sales and service office here, suspended sales and will keep its office open on a reduced basis.

If reports published here are true, Aeroflot, the Soviet Union's civil aviation company, is discouraged by the trend. According to news dispatches from Cuba and Russia, Aeroflot will begin scheduled service between Moscow and Santiago on Nov. 4, flying one round trip weekly with intermediate stops at Rabat, Havana and Lima, Peru.

BALTIMORE SUN
18 October 1972

Allende orders Santiago curfew

Santiago, Chile (AP)—President Salvador Allende's leftist government last night decreed a curfew in Santiago province in an effort to calm a week of protests and sporadic street violence.

Mr. Allende told copper mine officials that Chile's unrest could bring "a civil war."

The midnight-to-6 A.M. curfew was imposed at the start of a day of continuing unrest in which police battled demonstrators with tear gas and Chile's political conflict sharpened.

The government, despite the dissatisfaction, also banned the sale of beef in markets and restaurants until December. Beef, scarce for more than a year, previously was allowed to be sold on weekends only. That and similar consumer restrictions have provoked widespread discontent among housewives who find little left to buy.

The curfew announcement

was read over a nationwide radio network controlled by the government. It warned that military sentries and police patrols have been warned to shoot at anyone disobeying curfew regulations.

The Allende administration ordered the curfew after bus line owners threatened to join protest strikes by shopkeepers, truckers, students, bank clerks, engineers, copper mine supervisors and merchant marine personnel.

Incidents of violence increased. The national truckers strike, which touched off the wave of anti-government protest last week, gained support despite official warning that such action was seditious.

Luis Corvalan, secretary general of the Communist party, declared that the strikes and violence were amounting to "a civilian coup d'etat" against the government of Dr. Allende, Chile's Marxist Presi-

dent. Another Chilean province, Aconcagua, just north of Santiago, was declared under a state of emergency, a form of martial law. Now 18 of the country's 25 provinces, including the capital, are subject to state of emergency restrictions.

The police fired dozens of tear gas canisters in downtown Santiago to break up groups of Marxists and anti-Marxists.

Riot trucks swept the streets with high-pressure streams of water to disperse the demonstrators.

For the second day in a row, a section of railroad track linking Santiago with the Pacific coast was blown up by terrorists.

Shots were fired at a truck carrying food to the capital from Valparaiso, Chile's main port. A Molotov cocktail thrown from a passing car barely missed a suburban Santiago bus.

High school students and

many bank employees joined the striking truckers and a strike by sympathizing shopkeepers. Doctors and dentists announced a 48-hour strike beginning today.

Captains of the Compania Sud Americana de Vapores, a Chilean steamship line, announced they would stage a 48-hour strike. This meant paralyzing a dozen Chilean merchant ships in ports around the world.

The trucking strike began after talks collapsed between the Confederation of Truck Owners and Dr. Allende's leftist coalition, which includes Communists and Socialists. The truckers wanted higher cargo rates and objected to formation of a state-controlled trucking company in southern Chile.

The increasing support for the week-long truckers strike has taken on wider antigovernment tones, including open abuse of police and the Army.

From COMMUNIST sources

VOIX OUVRIERE, Geneva
15 August 1972

Déclaration du BP du PCI

Sur les procès en Tchécoslovaquie

Le Bureau politique du Parti communiste italien a publié, la semaine dernière, un communiqué adopté par lui. Ce communiqué ayant été cité partiellement et commenté, nous jugeons bon de le publier in-extenso.

Il a la teneur suivante :

« L'ouverture, en Tchécoslovaquie, d'une série de procès politiques — dont quelques-uns se sont déjà terminés par de lourdes condamnations — soulève de nouveaux et graves problèmes sur la situation existant dans ce pays à quatre ans de l'intervention militaire d'août 1968 et sur les principes de base de la construction du socialisme. Il s'agit de questions qui ne peuvent pas ne pas toucher tout parti communiste et sur lesquelles c'est donc un devoir légitime, en l'absence, entraînées d'informations complètes et d'explications de nature à persuader, de soulever des réserves, tout en se refusant à s'ingérer dans la vie interne d'un autre pays et étant clair que chaque parti porte la responsabilité de ses propres actes et de ses propres positions.

Le Parti communiste italien par ses organes dirigeants et sa presse et aussi, de la manière la plus nette, par ses deux derniers congrès, a affirmé et répété ses points de vue, tant sur la crise tchécoslovaque que sur les problèmes généraux de la démocratie socialiste. Mais le récent recours aux méthodes de poursuites judiciaires — à l'égard d'hommes qui furent, jusqu'en 1968, des porte-parole qualifiés du Parti communiste et de la culture tchécoslovaque et qui d'autre part étaient déjà privés de toute possibilité d'intervenir dans la vie publique et éloignés de leurs travaux professionnels, attire l'attention sur la gravité durable de la situation en Tchécoslovaquie. Il est particulièrement grave de poursuivre une logique de revanche, sur tous les plans et à fond à l'endroit de ceux qui défendaient le « nouveau cours » politique qui s'est affirmé en Tchécoslovaquie en 1968. C'est de tout cela que résulte le dissentiment renouvelé et la réprobation que le Bureau politique du PCI entend manifester.

En ce qui concerne les procès récents, en fait, on n'a pas fait connaître le contenu concret des positions soutenues par les accusés, pas plus que les actes accomplis par eux. En outre, la référence aux lois régissant la République tchécoslovaque ne résout pas la question de savoir comment sont réellement garanties les libertés d'opinion et d'expression. On voit ainsi apparaître à la lumière, une fois de plus et comme d'importantes questions de principe —

spécialement quand on a dépassé la phase dramatique de l'avènement et de la consolidation d'un processus de transformation révolutionnaire de la société — les questions du plein respect de la légalité socialiste, qui comporte l'exclusion des délits d'opinion, la publicité des procès et, plus encore, la confrontation politique et idéologique ouverte pour vaincre des positions réellement négatives et dangereuses. Sur ce terrain aussi, il faut confirmer la supériorité historique du socialisme déjà démontrée lumineusement dans tant de pays, sur toutes les formes du régime capitaliste et de la démocratie bourgeoise. Les communistes italiens réaffirment de la manière la plus nette, leur volonté d'ouvrir la voie en Italie, — ensemble avec les autres forces d'orientation socialiste — à la construction d'une société nouvelle dans laquelle puisse se développer tout le riche patrimoine des traditions et des conquêtes démocratiques de notre peuple et dans laquelle la plus large et la plus active intervention des masses, la pleine garantie de la liberté d'opinion et d'expression, la méthode du débat et de la lutte politique et idéologique ouverte.

Dans le même temps, le Bureau politique du PCI repousse avec fermeté les grossières déformations et les attaques anticomunistes des forces de droite et des groupes qui, depuis vingt cinq ans, gouvernent l'Italie.

A ces derniers il suffit de répondre ceci : par les odieuses tendances à l'arbitraire et à la répression, dont ils témoignent avec tant d'obstination, par les formes les plus variées du scandale des procédures judiciaires qui prolongent au delà de toutes limites la détention préventive et par le recours aux normes des codes fascistes pour la répression de délits d'opinion, par leurs silences complices et par les services qu'ils offrent eux-mêmes aux pires entreprises d'oppression et de guerre que la politique des classes dirigeantes capitalistes et de l'impérialisme dirige dans le monde il leur manque toute justification politique et morale pour s'ériger en tuteurs des principes démocratiques et en censeur des expériences tourmentées des pays socialistes.

Le Bureau politique
du Parti communiste italien

L'HUMANITE, Paris
28 August 1972

L'HUMANITE COUNTERS HUSAK REMARKS ON PRAGUE TRIALS

In a speech delivered in Bratislava on 26 August Gustav Husak, Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee general secretary, referred, among other things, to the sentences recently passed in his country.

"Our tribunals," he said, "have been obliged to punish several dozen people who violated the republic's laws."

Let us recall what our party's Politburo declared, among other things, on 28 July 1972 with reference to this:

"Whenever forces hostile to socialism, be they internal or external, resort to really subversive methods and whenever they resort to violence or sabotage, it is both just and necessary that they be subjected to the rigors of the law....

"However, whenever it is a question of political and ideological opposition, we believe it right to act by means of an intensive political and ideological struggle waged with the support of workers and popular masses to defeat and isolate enemies of socialism."

Furthermore, Gustav Husak expressed his sorrow that "certain representatives of Western progressive forces" had adopted, with reference to this, an attitude which, he said, "cannot help the common class struggle."

Let us, therefore, state that the PCF abides by both the letter and the spirit of the declaration adopted at the June 1969 communist and workers parties Moscow conference which said, among other things: "Improvement of socialist democracy, development of productive forces, political and cultural progress, and superiority of human and moral values increases and influence exerted by socialism on workers throughout the world and consolidates its own positions in the struggle of universal importance it is waging against imperialism."

A propos d'un discours de Gustav Husak

Dans un discours prononcé samedi à Bratislava, Gustav Husak, secrétaire général du Comité central du Parti communiste tchécoslovaque, a évoqué notamment les récentes condamnations dans son pays.

« Nos tribunaux, a-t-il dit, ont été obligés de châtier plusieurs dizaines de personnes qui avaient enfreint les lois de la République. »

Rappelons ce que le Bureau politique de notre Parti déclarait notamment à ce propos le 28 juillet dernier :

« Lorsque les forces hostiles au socialisme, de l'intérieur et de l'extérieur, ont recours à des procédés véritablement subversifs, lorsqu'elles recourent à la violence ou au sabotage, il est juste et nécessaire qu'elles subissent les rigueurs de la loi... »

« ... S'agissant de l'opposition politique et idéologique, nous considérons que c'est par le moyen d'une lutte politique et idéologique intense, menée en s'appuyant sur les

travailleurs et les masses populaires, qu'il convient d'agir pour battre et isoler les adversaires du socialisme. »

Gustav Husak s'est également déclaré peiné que « certains représentants des forces progressistes occidentales » aient adopté, à ce propos, une position qui, a-t-il dit, « ne peut aider à la lutte de classe commune ».

Indiquons à ce propos que le Parti Communiste Français s'en tient à la lettre et à l'esprit de la Déclaration de

la Conférence de Moscou des Partis communistes et ouvriers de juin 1969 qui précise entre autres : « Le perfectionnement de la démocratie socialiste, l'essor de forces productives, les progrès politiques et culturels, la supériorité des valeurs humaines et morales augmentent l'influence exercée par le socialisme sur les travailleurs du monde entier et renforcent ses positions dans la lutte de portée universelle qu'il mène contre l'impérialisme. »

Giorni-Vie Nuove
Rome, 6 September 1972

Czech Trials, Soviet Role in Czechoslovakia Decried

A lot of people are saying it is better not to talk about it, that it is better not to let drop certain subjects. One of these, for example, is tired old Czechoslovakia. But no. We must discuss then, and talk it through after hearing the ravens of anti-socialism, the fascists disguised like good burghers or Christian Democrats, after the center-left government, the living-color government, decided to make its evil influence felt (and there was really no need to do it) even over RAI-TV (Italian radio and TV agency), where for days and days we heard nothing but talk about Prague, of spiritual death, of occupation troops, and of the death of all freedoms in the socialist countries.

Precisely in order that these trained magpies may no longer be heeded, precisely so that these apes whose interests are to serve their boss, further their own careers, and to hell with freedom, may no longer pose and posture up there -- this is why we must say our piece, and why we must guide our actions accordingly. When we published the interview with our friend and comrade Smrkovsky, on the one side, people told us that we should not have done it, and on the other they pointed to us as martyrs, if you can believe it, martyrs who were slated to be punished and sent to Coventry.

Naturally, we had no time to listen to either side. We published the interview because we believed that it was indispensable to publish it, because we believed that the words of a socialist fighter like Smrkovsky would be both useful and helpful, even to those who did not want to hear them and who thought best to respond to them with insults for him and ostracism for us. If his lofty appeal for reconciliation had been heeded then, there would not have been these dreadful trials, nor the hundreds of thousands of expulsions from the party, nor the other persecutions, nor the absurd explanations about the justice and legality of certain exquisitely political trials by those who today control Czechoslovakia (with the Soviet commander of the Warsaw Pact troops at their elbow).

Nor is the defense of this Czechoslovak situation which emanates from the USSR becoming to the fatherland the October Revolution and the 20th CPSU Congress, which is in fact and will forever stand forth as the land of socialism and freedom.

A question of security? But what kind of security is that of a people guarded by tanks, an absurd security that can stifle the independence and freedom of a people, the autonomy of a party?

It was these same leaders of the USSR who, in that 20th Congress, voted the end of Stalinist monolithism, the end of the guide-party and the guide-state, who approved national paths to reach a more fervent and solid proletarian internationalism, thus strengthening the ties with all the socialist movements throughout the world, summoning all party-members, all the young, all the masses of the people to full participation not only in implementation, but also in decision-making. Why should it be these same men today who suggest that we do just the opposite, that we should go back to the old ways that we left because of the deaths they caused and the degeneration to which they subjected socialist practice?

If we had gone on in the same primary line of struggle which the 20th Congress chose in close contact with the new reality and the new dimension in world problems, perhaps the legitimate revolt of the young might have been a contribution to the struggle of the working class and its organizations, to the struggle for socialism, rather than against it, as it unfortunately turned out to be, with sad consequences for both parties concerned.

We must change our course. On this road where there is no freedom, and hence there is no socialism. We cannot and will not follow it further. Only this way can we here at home call by their right names those hideous vultures who make special broadcasts and pages and flowery essays on Prague, not because they love liberty but because they hate socialism, only because we call a spade a spade can we say that there is in the world a graveyard, not only a moral one, but a very real one, with millions of innocent dead, and it is Vietnam, where, not armored vehicles, which fortunately have not fired from countries that claim to be friends, but hundreds and hundreds of flying fortresses from an enemy country that has not even bothered to declare war, are daily killing women and children, savagely exterminating an entire people.

This is the only way in which socialism can be ever and always revolutionary, eternally the standard-bearer of freedom. This is the only way it can carry the world along with it to justice and happiness for all men. Today, more than ever, mankind must be viewed as the most precious thing we have.

GIORNI-VIE NUOVE, Rome
6 September 1972

Dobbiamo parlare e fare

Molti dicono: meglio non parlarne, certi argomenti è meglio lasciarli cadere. Uno di questi per esempio, è la vecchia Cecoslovacchia. E invece no, invece bisogna discuterne e fino in fondo proprio dopo avere sentito anche i corvi dell'antisocialismo, i fascisti vestiti da borghesi o da democristiani, proprio dopo che il governo di centro-destra, il governo a colori, ha voluto fare sentire la sua influenza nelata (e non ve n'era davvero necessità) anche attraverso la Rai-TV dove per giorni e giorni non s'è parlato che di Praga, dell'obitorio morale, di truppe d'occupazione, di fine di ogni libertà nei paesi socialisti.

Anzi, è proprio perché non possano più avere voce essere ascoltate quelle gazze ammaestrate, proprio perché non possano più sbracciarsi questi immisioni a cui interessa servire il padrone, la carriera e lo stipendio e per nulla la libertà, è proprio per questo che noi dobbiamo non solo aprire la nostra ma regalarci di conseguenza. Quando abbiamo pubblicato l'intervista del nostro amico e compagno Smrkowski, da una parte ci hanno detto che non era il caso e dall'altra ci hanno fatto apparire addirittura dei martiri destinati ad essere puniti ed emarginati.

Naturalmente non abbiamo voluto ascoltare né gli uni né gli altri. Avevamo pubblicato quell'intervista perché ritenevamo indispensabile pubblicarla, ritenevamo le parole di un combattente socialista come Smrkowski molto utili e importanti anche per coloro che non hanno voluto intenderle ed hanno preferito rispondere con l'insulto a lui e l'ostracismo a noi. Se allora fosse stato ascoltato il suo nobile appello alla pacificazione non ci sarebbero stati i tristissimi processi, né la continua di migliaia di esclusioni dal partito, né altre persecuzioni, né giustificazioni assurde di chi dirige oggi la Cecoslovacchia (con a lato il comandante militare sovietico delle truppe del patto di Varsavia) sulla giustizia e la regolarità di certe condanne squisitamente politiche.

Anche le difese di questa situazione cecoslovacca che vengono dall'URSS non sono certo giuste per un paese che è quello della Rivoluzione d'Ottobre e quello del XX congresso, che è in sostanza e vuole sempre più essere il paese del socialismo e della libertà.

La sicurezza? Ma quale sicurezza è quella di un popolo vigilato da carri armati e questa assurda sicurezza può sopprimere l'indipendenza, la libertà di un popolo, l'autonomia di un partito?

Erano questi stessi dirigenti dell'URSS a votare in quello storico congresso la fine del monolitismo stalinista, la fine del partito e dello Stato guida, ad approvare vie nazionali per arrivare ad un più convinto e solido internazionalismo proletario rafforzando anzi i collegamenti con tutti i movimenti socialisti nel mondo, chiamando alla partecipazione, non solo nell'attuazione ma anche nella direzione, tutti i militanti, i giovani, le masse popolari. Perché oggi devono essere loro a proporre e a fare l'opposto, a tornare su orme superate per i morti che hanno causato e le degenerazioni cui hanno sottoposto la prassi socialista?

Se si continuava nella linea rivoluzionaria e di lotta che il XX congresso aveva scelto in stretto legame con la nuova realtà e la nuova dimensione dei problemi del mondo forse la giusta rivolta dei giovani poteva essere un contributo alla lotta della classe operaia e delle sue organizzazioni, alla lotta per il socialismo, non contro, come purtroppo è avvenuto con danno degli uni e degli altri.

Bisogna cambiare strada. Su questa strada dove non c'è libertà, e perciò non c'è socialismo, noi non vi possiamo, non vi vogliamo seguire. Solo così possiamo qui da noi, chiamare col loro nome gli orridi corvi che fanno speciali trasmissioni e pagine o articolano il socialismo, solo perché amano la libertà ma perché odiano il socialismo, solo perché diciamo pane al pane possiamo dire che c'è nel mondo un obitorio non solo morale ma anche reale con milioni di morti innocenti ed è il Vietnam dove non carri armati che fortunatamente non hanno sparato di paesi che si dicono amici, ma centinaia e centinaia di forze volanti di un paese amico che non si è neppure scomodato a dichiarare guerra, uccidono quotidianamente donne e bambini, sterminano un popolo.

Solo così il socialismo sarà sempre e ancora rivoluzionario e attiene della libertà o trascinerà il mondo alla giustizia e alla felicità dell'uomo che è da considerarsi oggi più che mai il materiale più prezioso.

Ulisso

Friheten

Oslo, 18-23 September 1972

Criticism of Prague Trials Defended

In a lengthy article in issue 36 of Friheten V. Davidsen expressed his disagreement with the appraisal made by the Norwegian CP and other western Communist parties of the trials held in Prague and Brno this summer in which men who were leaders during the Dubcek period received long prison sentences for "anti-socialist activities." He sharply criticized the comments made by the undersigned in particular. Of course Davidsen has a perfect right to present his views without interference on the part of the editors. And if the only thing involved was his defense of the sentences in Prague and Brno, his criticism of the Norwegian CP and other Communist parties for having taken a different stand, then we would have refrained from making any comment.

But Davidsen's article contains substantially more than that and this seems to be his main point. For example, it is not very comradely behavior -- to put it mildly -- to call party comrades who do not share his views doubtful Communists, Communists he would prefer to put in quotation marks! This method of debate has not been unknown in the party in the past, of course, but we had hoped that we had seen the last of it now. And it makes a reply not only justified but necessary.

Concrete Information?

It is not true, Davidsen claims, that we who write for Friheten have received no concrete information about what the defendants in Prague and Brno were sentenced for. Davidsen himself -- "and others along with me who do not possess KAS's perspective have received heaps of correct information, so that we can be certain that we know the concrete facts" -- he says. In that case V.D. should send his information to the editors who are very interested. Unless, that is, the information has the following background -- that the way the bourgeois authorities have dealt with the trials in Czechoslovakia is, as V.D. maintains, "more than enough proof that the sentences were correct and just." In which case the "information" is really concrete, isn't it?

And what about our information? The editors of Friheten receive daily Soviet, French, German, English, and other party newspapers. None has said anything concrete about the famous trials quite simply because Prague has not provided an explanation. Those sentenced have carried out "anti-socialist activities" but what kind and how is still unknown. The Soviet press which because of its contacts with the Czechs should come the closest to giving us concrete information has given us the least.

We must also put a stop to another assertion by V.D., namely that "KAS and the Norwegian CP, furthermore, completely support the men of the Dubcek era." No, V.D., only once in its postwar history has the Norwegian CP refused to recognize the central committee of a brother party. To be sure that was long ago, but it was quite an embarrassing episode for our party in the end -- it happened to be the Yugoslavian party! Since then, as a matter of principle, the Norwegian CP has never tried to intervene in the internal affairs of a brother party just as we have resisted outside attempts to intervene in ours.

And as far as I am concerned, finally, V.D.'s claim is just as false. I knew no more of the men of the Dubcek era than did any alert newspaper reader at that time. The thorough evaluation the Czech party later made of them and their political weaknesses appears to me to be factual and correct. Besides that I have on every possible occasion sought further information from Czech and Slovak comrades when I met them in their own country or in other socialist countries abroad. But it is the treatment of these former party leaders, or some of them, that has led me to react sharply once in a while. During the trials, for example.

Socialist Democracy

What did the charges involve? Not the activities of the accused during the period when Dubcek led the party but their opposition to the new party leadership since that time. That is what is being concealed behind the concept of "anti-socialist activities." And this is precisely where western Communist parties have a different concept of socialist democracy than Prague does. Our French comrades maintain that there must be complete freedom of speech not only for divergent opinions within the party itself but also for opponents of the party as long as violent means or sabotage are not employed. That is socialist democracy. The party itself must be strong enough ideologically to convince the masses of the correct political line, that of the party majority or that of the dissenters. The party must be strong enough ideologically to isolate its opponents. Such a socialist democracy is in the spirit of the Moscow declaration, the French CP goes on to say and in my opinion they are quite correct.

French CP and Communism

But it appears that V.D. has little respect for the French CP. The party has distorted the Moscow declaration he says and is not really a Communist party at all. Proof? The French CP's joint election program with the Social Democrats -- a triumph for unity activity in the French labor movement after 14 years of hard work, an event which the Soviet press in particular has praised the French CP for. The proven French CP was the way I characterized that party. V.D. does not agree, he puts the word "proven" in quotation marks and tries in every way to diminish it. It is probably not worth the trouble to try to explain to him what I mean, so I will let that go. He must also know that in this article he is quite on a level with the worst "leftist" extremists in French politics who are not afraid to state that the French CP itself is the principal enemy.

Or doesn't he know that?

FRIHETEN, Oslo
18-25 September 1972

Et svar til V. H. Davidsen

V. Davidsen har i et lengre innlegg i Friheten nr. 36 uttrykt sin dype uenighet med den vurdering som NKP og øvrige vestlige KP har tatt til rettssakene i Praha og Brno i sommer, og der vedende menn fra Dubcek-iden fikk lange fengselsstraffer for «antisosialistisk virksomhet». Ganske spesielt faller kritikken hardt mot undertegnades kommentar. Vel, det er selvsagt Davidsens soleklare rett å få fram sitt syn, uten enhver hale fra redaksjonens side. Og var det bare hans forsvar for dommene i Praha og

Brno det gjaldt, hans kritikk mot NKP og øvrige KP for å ha inntatt et annet standpunkt — vil'e vi la spart oss enhver kommentar.

Av KÅS

Men Davidsens innlegg inneholder noe vesentlig mer, og det synes å være hovedsaken for ham. Det er f.eks. en noe ukameratslig framferd — mildt sagt — samtidig å framstille partifeller som ikke deler hans syn som tvilsomme kommunister, kommunister han helst ville sette i anførselstegn! Det er jo en debatt-metode som til tider ikke

har vært ukjent i partiet, men som vi håpet vi hadde sett slutten på nå. Og da blir et tilsvaret ikke bare berettiget, men nødvendig.

Konkrete informasjoner?

Det er ikke riktig, hevder VD, at vi som skriver i Friheten ikke har fått konkrete opplysninger om hva de tiltalte fra Praha og Brno ble dømt for. VD selv — "og flere med meg, som ikke kan ha den oversikt som KÅS har, har fått riktige informasjoner i haugevis slik at vi med sikkerhet vet konkret —", påstår han. I så fall VD, send inn dine informasjoner til redaksjonen, som er meget interessert. Hvis informasjonene du ikke skulle ha

følgende bakgrunn: de borgerlige nyhetsmedias behandling av retts-sakene i Tsjekkoslovakia som ifølge VD "er mer enn gode nok beviser på at dommene er riktige og rettferdige". Da blir jo "informasjonene" virkelig konkrete, ikke sant?

Og våre Informasjoner da? Frihetens redaksjon mottar daglig sovjetisk, fransk, tysk, engelsk og annen partipresse. Ingen har hatt noe konkret om de famøse rettssakene, ganske enkelt fordi det ikke er blitt opplyst fra Praha. De dømte har drevet "antisosialistisk virksomhet", men hva slags og hvordan er fortsatt ukjent. Sovjetpressen, som gjennom sine forblinder med den tsjekkoslovakiske burde være den nærmeste til å gi oss konkrete opplysninger, gjør det aller minst.

Vi må også arrestere en annen påstand fra VD, nemlig den at "KAS og NKP fremdeles helt og fullt" går inn for Dubcek-tidens menn. Nei, VD, en eneste gang i sin etterkrigs-historie har NKP nektet å godkjenne et broderpartis sentralstyre. Det er rett nok lenge siden, men det ble en temmelig flau historie for vårt parti til slutt — det gjaldt nemlig det jugoslaviske partiet! Siden har NKP av prinsipielle grunner aldri forsøkt å blande seg inn i broderpartiers indre saker, like så vel som vi har avvist forsøk på innblanding utenfra i våre egne.

Og hva meg selv angår, er VDs påstand like gal. Om Dubcek-tidens menn visste jeg ikke mer enn enhver oppmerksom avisleser i sin tid gjorde. Det tsjekkoslovakiske partiets grundige vurdering av dem og deres politiske svakheter siden, forekommer meg saklig og riktig. Dertil har jeg ikke latt et eneste høve gå fra meg til å søke videre opplysning fra tsjekkiske og slovakiske kamerater når jeg traff på dem, i deres hjemland eller et annet sosialistisk utland. Men det er behandlingen av disse tidligere lederne i partiet, eller enkelte av dem, som har fått meg til å reagere skarpt en gang i blant. Som nå under prosessen f.eks.

Sosialistisk demokrati

Hva gjaldt anklagene? De gjaldt ikke de tilfallets virksomhet under Dubceks ledelse av partiet, men deres opposisjon mot den nye partiledelsen siden. Det er dette som skjuler seg bak begrepet "antisosialistisk virksomhet". Og nettopp her er det KP i vest vurderer begrepet sosialistisk demokrati annerledes enn f.eks. Praha. Våre franske kamerater hevder at det må være full ytringsfrihet ikke bare for divergerende meninger i selve partiet, men også for partiets motstandere såfremt ikke voldsmidler eller sabotasje tas i bruk. Dette er sosialistisk demokrati. Partiet må selv være ideo-

logisk sterkt nok til å overbevise massene om den riktige politiske linjen, partifertallets eller dissidenternes. Partiet må være sterkt nok ideologisk til å isolere sine motstandere. Et slikt sosialistisk demokrati er i Moskva-erklæringens ånd, sier FKP videre, og etter min mening med full rett.

FKP og kommunismen

Men FKP har VD liten respekt for, later det til. Partiet har gitt Moskva-erklæringen "på båten" sier han, og er egentlig intet kommunistisk parti. Beviset? Det er FKPs felles valgprogram med sosialdemokratene — en seler for enhetsarbeidet i fransk arbeiderbevegelse etter 14 års seigt arbeid, en begivenhet som ikke minst sovjetpressen har rost FKP for. Det prøvde franske KP var min karakteristikk av dette partiet. VD er ikke enig, han setter ordet "prøvede" i anførsel og søker å redusere det på alle vis. Det er sikkert spilt møyen å prøve å forklare ham hva jeg mener, så jeg lar det være. Han vet vel også at han i dette stykke er helt på linje med de verste "venstre"-ekstremister i fransk politikk som ikke er redd for å erklære at FKP er selve hovedfienden.

Eller vet han det kanskje ikke?